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Abstract 
This research first addresses the different tax treatment that is given to debt and equity 
financing, showing that the benefits associated with debt make this source of financing more 
attractive. The different treatment of these two forms of finance incentivizes debt exploitation, 
by which deductibility of interest payments decreases the tax base in a high-tax jurisdiction, 
preferably ending up in a low-tax jurisdiction’s tax base. This project shows that the 
deductibility of interest for tax purposes combined with the existence of a myriad of different 
tax systems leads to a number of possibilities for tax arbitrage, especially through 
international debt-shifting and hybrid financial instruments. 
It then demonstrates that the most popular response given by countries to mitigate this 
debt bias problem has been the adoption of thin capitalization rules which are aimed at 
limiting the deduction of interest that is deemed excessive. This research intends to look at 
these rules in the context of the OECD, tax treaties and EU law. 
The work presented concludes by providing two alternatives (the ACE and the CBIT 
systems) in order to achieve more neutrality between debt and equity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: group financing, multinational companies, tax arbitrage, thin capitalization 
rules, interest deduction. 
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Resumo 
Esta pesquisa começa por abordar o diferente tratamento fiscal que é dado à dívida e à 
equidade, mostrando que os benefícios associados com a dívida tornam esta fonte de 
financiamento mais atractiva. A diferença de tratamento entre estas duas formas de 
financiamento incentiva a exploração da dívida, através da qual a dedutibilidade de juros 
diminui a base tributária numa jurisdição de alta tributação, de preferência terminando numa 
jurisdição que aplique baixas taxas de imposto. Este projeto mostra que a dedutibilidade de 
juros para efeitos fiscais, combinada com a existência de uma miríade de diferentes sistemas 
fiscais, leva a uma série de possibilidades para arbitragem fiscal, especialmente através do 
deslocamento da dívida a nível internacional e de instrumentos financeiros híbridos. 
É, seguidamente, demonstrado que a resposta mais popular dada pelos países para 
atenuar este problema de recurso excessivo ao financiamento por endividamento tem sido a 
adopção de regras de subcapitalização, que visam limitar a dedução dos juros considerada 
excessiva. Esta pesquisa pretende analisar estas regras no contexto da OCDE, dos tratados 
fiscais internacionais e da legislação Europeia. 
Na sua parte final, este trabalho oferece duas alternativas (os sistemas CBIT e ACE) 
com vista a alcançar mais neutralidade entre as duas formas de financiamento. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Palavras-chave: financiamento intra-grupo, empresas multinacionais, planeamento 
fiscal agressivo, regras de subcapitalização, dedutibilidade de juros. 
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Introduction 
The development of international trade and the growth of new business strategies have 
turned the world into a massive global market. As a result of increasing globalization and 
competitiveness, companies are vigorously reconsidering their business models and 
operational structures by relocating capital and labour from one country to another.1 
Companies operating in an international environment are usually provided with greater 
opportunities to enter new and more appealing markets and to produce at lower costs. 
However, companies also face costs and difficulties when operating in different 
countries and these are usually associated with economic and cultural reasons2 and with non-
harmonized legal structures3. Tax systems represent a typical example of this. On this subject 
studies have suggested that tax harmonization may be an unlikely scenario, at least in the near 
future, and the history of the European Union has also shown the difficulty of designing a 
common tax framework for countries, even if they have common trade interests.4 
Direct tax systems fall within the sovereign competence of the states and, as a result, 
different tax rates are applied.5 Different tax rates and different tax treatment lead to tax 
competition, which gives taxpayers the possibility to choose jurisdictions that provide them 
with better tax opportunities. The main purpose of a business is to maximize profits and to 
reduce costs and since taxes are a major cost that companies have to face, they will try to 
exploit tax differentials in order to achieve tax optimization. 
The methods by which a company is financed are thus very important given that they 
will influence the taxation of corporate income. Company financing can be done by means of 
equity and debt6. This research will first look at the different treatment that is given to these 
capital structure strategies and show that, because most countries tax debt and equity in a 
                                                 
1
 Finnerty, et al., “Fundamentals of International Tax Planning”, IBFD, 2007, p.252. 
2
 For a more detailed overview see Dunning, “The Eclectic (OLI) Paradigm of International Production: Past, Present and Future”, 
International Journal of the Economics of Business, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2001, pp. 173-190. 
3
 Wendt, “A Common Tax Base for Multinational Enterprises in the European Union”, Gabler: Wiesbaden, 2009, pp.12 et seq. 
4
 Mitchell, “The Economics of Tax Competition Harmonization vs. Liberalization”, Adam Smith Institute, November 2009, pp. 1-12.  
5
 Considering direct taxation, this autonomy, however, may be considerably restricted by secondary EU law in the form of directives and by 
international tax treaties. 
6
 Zaburaite, “Debt and Equity in International Company Taxation”, in International Group Financing and Taxes, Wien: Linde, 2012, pp. 11-
32. 
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different manner, there is a tax-induced bias towards debt financing.7 This study will then 
demonstrate that the different treatment given to these types of funding can lead to aggressive 
tax planning in the sense that multinational companies have the opportunity to finance their 
foreign subsidiaries, usually residents in high-tax jurisdictions, by replacing equity financing 
with a high proportion of debt-financing.8 
Aggressive tax planning is a subject of broad and current interest in the international 
policy agenda given that many countries face high levels of debt and huge pressure to 
generate tax revenue. For this study two types of tax arbitrage are particularly relevant: hybrid 
financial instruments and debt-shifting within international groups. 
We have witnessed a sort of cat-and-mouse game between companies - trying to 
reduce their tax liability through exploiting loopholes in existing tax rules; and governments - 
subsequently concerned with the loss of tax revenues.9 States try to counteract this process by 
adopting standards aimed at combating specific behaviours and situations that, because of the 
risks they involve, deserve special attention. 
One of the specific measures adopted is the thin capitalization regime, which attempts 
to prevent, on the one hand, excessive debt and, on the other, the movement of income for 
states whose tax jurisdictions are more attractive. In order to preserve their own tax revenues, 
many OECD countries have adopted thin capitalization rules. 
Over the last few years, thin-capitalization rules have attracted considerable attention 
due to their possible interference with EU law and interaction with tax treaty provisions. This 
project addresses the compatibility of national thin capitalization rules with the European 
Union law, specifically with the fundamental freedoms of the TFEU. Assuming that closing 
loopholes usually leads to refinements and complexities of tax laws, the final goal of this 
paper is to see if thin capitalization rules are a viable instrument and an effective solution to 
the problem of debt bias. 
This research concludes by providing two possible solutions to the debt bias problem 
in order to achieve more neutrality in the treatment that is given to debt and equity. 
                                                 
7
 Vleggeert, “Interest Deduction Based on the Allocation of Worldwide Debt”, Bulletin for International Taxation, volume 68, No 2, 2014, 
p.103. 
8
 Haufler and Runkle, “Firms” Financial Choices and Thin Capitalization Rules under Corporate Tax Competition”, CESifo working paper, 
October 2008, p.1. 
9
 Fuest, Spengel, Finke, et al., “Profit Shifting and “Aggressive” Tax Planning by Multinational Firms: Issues and Options for Reform”, 
Discussion Paper No. 13-078, 2013. 
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 Equity vs. Debt 1.
 A legal perspective 1.1.
Group financing is a major concern for international tax law policy makers because 
the methods companies choose to finance their operations will have impact on the taxation of 
corporate income10. In order to raise capital and expand or save the business, companies need 
to explore financial resources. External financing can therefore be achieved by virtue of new 
equity or new debt.  
Equity financing comprises the sale of ownership shares in the company in exchange 
for advanced payment per share. With this financing method, shareholders expect to recover 
their money by taking part in the company's growth. The return on investment will, therefore, 
be in accordance with the prosperity of the company.  
With debt financing, capital is made available through a loan from a bank or a lender 
or through the sale of bonds. The money has to be paid back at a fixed interest rate within a 
stipulated period of time. Independently from the performance of the company in the 
following years, the terms of the loan usually remain the same as the return on investment that 
the lender expects to receive. 
Even though equity and debt share the same economic purpose- to provide finance to 
the business, the fact is that most jurisdictions treat equity and debt differently and thus some 
properties are used in order to distinguish them. Debt holders have a legal right to receive a 
return that is previously established, regardless of the financial status of the debtor. In what 
concerns equity holders, they receive a return that is changeable since it is dependent on the 
company’s performance. In the case of insolvency debt holders have a prior claim to the 
company’s assets while equity suppliers receive any residual claims only after debt has been 
paid.11 Also, suppliers of equity usually have control rights over the company while debt 
holders do not. 
For tax purposes, the most significant difference is that interest payments are 
deductible for corporate income tax purposes while equity returns are not. While equity 
                                                 
10
 Sommerhalder, “Approaches to Thin Capitalization” European Taxation, March 1996, p.82. 
11
 Schön, et al., “Debt and Equity: What’s the Difference? A Comparative View”, Competition and Tax Law Research Paper 09-09, Munich: 
Max Planck for Intellectual Property, 2009. 
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investment seeks to create a return for the investor in the form of a distribution of taxable 
profits, the return on a loan investment is, for the payer, an expense that has to be met before 
the profits can be determined.12 Moreover, the return on equity is taxed twice- at the level of 
distributing company and then in the hands of a recipient of dividends; whereas the return on 
the loan is taxed only once. Against this background, it may be more advantageous for 
companies to finance their investments with debt rather than equity capital.13   
Debt and equity features still leave scope for a wide variety of interpretive approaches 
making tax laws highly complex. Hybrid financial instruments, which will be addressed later 
in this research, are the major cause of this essentially because they combine some 
characteristics of equity and others of debt, ending up being an attractive channel for tax 
arbitrage. 
 Economic approach 1.2.
Miller and Modigliani (MM) developed a theorem regarding capital structure, 
company value and tax effects, which strongly contributed to the shaping of modern thinking. 
The MM capital-structure irrelevance theory, developed in 1958, suggests that the financial 
leverage of a company has no effect on its market value and, as such, the company value 
relies on cash-generating power rather than on the capital structure.14 In this sense, the 
WACC15 remains constant as the firm’s leverage grows. 
 This theory, however, fails by not taking into consideration real market conditions, 
such as, asymmetric information, taxes, transaction costs, bankruptcy costs, agency conflicts, 
adverse selection, among others. Independently from how a company borrows, there will not 
be any tax benefit from interest payments and, consequently, no alterations or benefits to the 
                                                 
12
 Soshnikov, “Structure and Elements of National Thin Capitalization Rules”, in International Group Financing and Taxes, Wien: Linde, 
2012, p.57. 
13
 Gouthière, “A Comparative Study of the Thin Capitalization Rules in the Member States of the European Union and Certain Other States: 
Introduction”, European Taxation, 2005, p.367. 
14
 Modigliani and Miller, “The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance and the Theory of Investment”, American Economic Review, vol. 48, No. 
3, 1958. 
15
 Weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is a calculation of a firm's cost of capital in which each category of capital is proportionately 
weighted. 
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WACC. In addition, as no changes or benefits derive from an increase in debt, the capital 
structure does not affect the company value in the market. 
In 1963 the MM model was revised and updated by adding, among others, a tax 
dimension and going against what had been previously established. This is especially because 
when taxes are integrated into this theory, a benefit is conferred to debt as, to a certain degree, 
interest payments protect earnings from taxes.16  The trade-off theory of leverage 
acknowledges that tax advantages come from interest payments, since interest paid on debt is 
deductible and dividends paid on equity are not.17 
In summary, the main difference between the two theories is that, while in the MM I 
theory, where taxes are not considered, the amount of a firm’s debt and equity is irrelevant, in 
the MM II, with corporate taxes, a firm which has more debt is more valuable due to the 
interest tax shield. 
Following evidence shows that tax benefits, among other factors, influence financing 
choices.18 However, opinions diverge regarding which factors are considered to have more 
importance and how they may influence firm’s value. 
Potencial risks of excessive debt 1.3.
When a firm increases its debt beyond the amount estimated by the optimal capital 
structure, the cost to finance debt usually rises given that the lender is now placed in a 
situation where he is more vulnerable to risk. 
Even though in the trade-off theory of leverage, a firm’s value is increased when it is 
approximately 100% debt financed, realistically, this does not help maintain the firm’s 
operations totally sustainable. The theory, however, recognizes that firms do not use as much 
debt when the expected costs associated with financial distress are high. Firms are usually 
influenced to prefer lower levels of debt especially because of the presence of agency, 
bankruptcy, and signaling costs.  
                                                 
16
 Modigliani and Miller, “Corporate income taxes and the cost of capital: a correction”, American Economic Review, vol. 53, No. 3, 1963. 
17
 Zaburaite, “Debt and Equity in International Company Taxation”, in International Group Financing and Taxes”, Wien: Linde, 2012, pp. 
11-32. 
18
 Graham, “A Review of Taxes and Corporate Finance”, vol. 1, No. 7, 2006, pp. 573–691; See, also, Shyam-Sunder and Myers, “Testing 
Static Tradeoff against Pecking Order Models of Capital Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics 51, 1999, pp.219-244. 
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Agency costs are related to negotiations that have to take place between stakeholders, 
particularly shareholders, bondholders and managers, in order to reach a consensus regarding 
the decision-making process of the company. Conflict of interests may arise where, for 
example, managers want to engage in risky activities- expecting to achieve higher returns for 
shareholders; but bondholders prefer a safer investment and place constraints on the use of 
their money in order to mitigate their risk.19Costs aimed at achieving a coordination of 
interests between the different stakeholders are called agency costs. Managers may have to 
convince shareholders that a specific type of financing will guarantee advantages to the 
business. Company value maximization alone is not sufficient. In this way, agency costs may 
interfere with leverage choices and mitigate the tax advantages offered by debt.20 
Bankruptcy costs, which usually increase with the level of debt, involve both direct 
and indirect costs. Direct costs comprise expenses like fees that a firm has to pay to lawyers, 
accountants, trustees, among others. Indirect costs are those that derive from a negative 
reaction in the market when the company is facing the possibility of bankruptcy. For example, 
suppliers may decrease payment terms, customers may consume less as they are concerned 
with the company’s ability to guarantee future assistance, and managers will be focused on 
the company’s survival, rather than looking for new business opportunities.21 The closer to 
bankruptcy, the higher the costs. Highly leverage companies are more exposed to shocks and, 
consequently, to the risk of bankruptcy. 
Debt issuance may also cause signaling costs. On this matter, authors’ opinion differ 
and empirical studies are, to a certain degree, inconclusive. On the one hand, debt issuance 
may suggest external investors that the company is confident in its capability to repay the debt 
(Ross 1977)22. On the other hand, Myers and Majluf (1984) claim that debt issuance can be 
viewed as a signal of bad health due to, for example, a lack of liquidity or internal resources 
in the company. In the pecking order theory, Myers and Majluf sustain that, first, companies 
resort to internal financing, then, and once this means is exhausted, they turn to debt issuance 
and, only when it is no longer reasonable to issue debt, do the firms resort to external equity.  
                                                 
19
  Jensen, “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers”, American Economic Review, vol. 76, No. 2, May 1986, 
pp. 323-329. 
20Van Horne and Wachowicz, “Fundamentals of Financial Management”, Harlow: Pearson Education, 13th edition, 2008, p.427. 
21
 Warner, “Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence”, The Journal of Finance, Volume 32, Issue 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth 
Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association, Atlantic City, New Jersey, May,1977, pp. 337-347. 
22
 Ross, “The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach”, The Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 8, No. 1, 
1977, pp. 23-40. 
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According to the authors, the issue of shares is the less preferred means to inject 
capital into the company because when managers who, as a general rule, are more informed 
about the real conditions of the company than the shareholders, issue shares, investors will 
assume that the company is overvalued and that managers are taking advantage of that. Under 
this theory, the asymmetric information between shareholders and managers may induce firms 
to use more debt than equity.23 
Also, the information asymmetry between debt and equity markets may originate 
differences in their international mobility by making debt more mobile than equity and, thus, 
more difficult to tax at source. Foreign investors may feel reluctant in acquiring a company in 
another country as they might be overcharged by domestic owners who have more 
information about the future expectations of the company.24 According to Tirole, “outsiders 
cannot observe the insiders’ carefulness in selecting projects, the riskiness of investments, or 
the effort they exert to make the firm profitable”.25 
Another relevant issue is the fact that credit constraints may be more applied to 
companies in growth than to mature companies. This is especially because lenders may be 
more reluctant to supply credit when they cannot verify certain behaviour by debtors. Thus, 
companies with relatively few assets and large investment opportunities, may not benefit from 
the general deduction for interest as much as companies that already have access to external 
borrowing. Consequently, this can lead to excessive investment by robust companies and too 
little investment by start-ups and growing companies. In this sense, the debt bias might 
decrease firm dynamics and foster long-term economic growth.26  
Deduction for debt is only allowed based on the premise that interest is the cost of 
doing business whereas equity returns reflect business income. However, this rationale may 
raise some questions in economic terms and more neutrality in the taxation of debt and equity 
might be desirable. The above mentioned considerations do not provide convincing reasons 
for a recurrent favouritism towards debt but the asymmetric tax treatment given to these 
                                                 
23Myers and Majiuf, “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information the Investors do Not Have”, NBER 
working paper series, working paper No. 1396, July1984. 
24
 Gordon and Bovenberg, “Why is Capital so Immobile Internationally? Possible Explanations and Implications for Capital Income 
Taxation”, National Bureau of Economic Research, working paper No. 4796, July 1994. 
25
 Tirole, “The Theory of Corporate Finance”, Princeton University Press, 2006, p.2.  
26
 Keuschnigg and Ribi, “Business Taxation, Corporate Finance and Economic Performance”, Discussion Paper no. 2010-04, January 2010. 
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means of financing investment may motivate companies to strongly rely on debt finance.27 In 
addition, debt financing has been used as a vehicle for aggressive tax planning through profit-
shifting to jurisdictions that apply lower tax rates. 
  
                                                 
27
 Haufler and Runkle, “Firms” Financial Choices and Thin Capitalization Rules under Corporate Tax Competition”, CESifo working 
paper, October 2008. 
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 Agressive tax planning and financial policies 2.
Tax planning, as a means of reducing or deferring the tax burden, is a practice that has 
accompanied the taxation over the centuries, being, therefore, something intrinsic to the 
existence of tax regimes. Tax planning is commonly defined as the set of acts which, under 
the law, are intended to reduce or minimize the tax burden of the taxpayer. 
While tax avoidance comprises the use of legal methods, tax evasion is a practice not 
only objectionable from an ethical point of view but also illegal and punishable under the 
terms defined by tax codes. Many consider tax planning a practice only accessible to a small 
group of taxpayers who use complex mechanisms in order to reduce or eliminate taxation, 
that is, tax planning is seen as a distant reality and only at the service of those who have the 
knowledge and the financial resources needed for this purpose. On this subject, it is relevant 
to note that tax planning is not an elitist practice but rather the application of the knowledge 
of the law to a specific tax situation.28 More than that, tax planning is a right of taxpayers. 
In the wise words of Saldanha Sanches, tax planning plays an indispensable role in a 
tax system where it is up to the taxpayer to interpret and apply the law and to determine and 
quantify its tax obligations.29 
Taxpayers have, on the one hand, a fundamental duty to pay their taxes, thereby 
contributing to the economic and social sustainability of the society in which they operate 
and, on the other, the freedom to fiscally plan their activities and their income in order to 
delimit the amount of their tax obligations. However, the distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate tax planning is becoming more tenuous and may depend on the interpretation and 
discretion of the tax administration.30 
Furthermore, the analysis and discussion of the main mechanisms of tax planning, as 
well as, remedies or measures adopted by the tax authorities to combat some types of 
aggressive tax planning may lead us to the traditional image of the cat and mouse game where 
the state defines the rules and taxpayers rapidly try to find ways to circumvent them and avoid 
taxation. Additionally, in the permanent tension between states and taxpayers, the state is not 
only a passive actor of tax planning, but also the main author of several tax planning 
                                                 
28Silva, in “O direito dos contribuintes ao planeamento fiscal”, TOC 104, November 2008. 
29
 Sanches, “As Duas Constituições- Nos Dez Anos da Cláusula Geral Anti-Abuso”, in “Reestruturação de Empresas e Limites do 
Planeamento Fiscal”, Coimbra Editora, 2009. 
30
 Russo, “Fundamentals of International Tax Planning”, IBFD, Amsterdam, 2007, pp. 49-61. 
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mechanisms and policies aiming at increasing tax competition in the country against third 
parties and achieving certain economic goals. 
The issue of tax planning begins to be truly discussed, however, when the behaviour 
of taxpayers deviates from the tax planning possibilities that the law, itself, deliberately 
allows and when taxpayers take advantage of legal forms and the letter of the law to achieve 
results that they would not get if they acted within the normal use of rules and business. 
Aggressive tax planning comprises the practice of lawful acts but whose results may 
not be accepted by the law because they are contrary to the principles underlying the tax 
system. In this case, the acts and practices of taxpayers are, per se, lawful but the tax 
authorities may consider these concrete acts illegitimate to the extent that they only seek to 
obtain the elimination or reduction of taxes.  
Multinational companies make important decisions in which taxation is a crucial 
factor. Such decisions may include where to locate a foreign operation, which legal form 
these operations should take and how these operations are to be financed. Companies can 
adopt different aggressive tax planning strategies to reduce their taxes by structuring their 
transactions and operations so that they result in the smallest tax burden possible.31 
In order to reduce its tax burden, a multinational corporation has various ways to 
structure its activities.This tax planning may involve conventional decisions to structure 
companies in a way which is tax efficient, for instance, by using debt instead of equity 
financing. However, there are also less conventional practices that take advantage of the 
specific characteristics of multinational enterprises. Particularly, tax planning makes use of 
profit-shifting strategies which merely entail the adjustment or adaptation of the internal 
structure of the multinational company. 
Although there are various ways to shift profits, one prominent technique comprises 
the use of internal loans by borrowing from affiliates situated in low-tax jurisdictions and 
lending to affiliates situated in high-tax countries. This will result in the reduction of profits 
throught the deduction of interest payments in high-tax countries. These profits will then be 
taxed as earnings in the low-tax jurisdiction. 
When multinational companies analyse their investment strategies, which include 
finding the best possible way to pay less taxes, they tend to adopt a profit-migration technique 
meaning the moving of profits from a high-tax jurisdiction to a lower-tax one. 
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Legislators have been trying to combat this phenomenon by creating anti-abuse 
measures. However, experience has shown that the innovations created by taxpayers are very 
advanced compared to the reaction means available to the legislator and the tax authorities.32 
Some of the problems faced by this common mission of enforcing the tax laws are the 
increasing globalization, the liberalization of capital markets and the technological 
innovation, leading to the emergence of corporate structures that may challenge the current 
tax rules and mechanisms that may facilitate the failure of national tax obligations. 
The use of offshore accounts, the movement of assets between companies in the same 
group and the use of different existing tax systems were some of the mechanisms highlighted 
in the Seoul conference, which took place in September 2006 and brought together leaders of 
the tax administrations of 35 countries.33 The conference also brought to light concerns with 
the role of legal and financial consultancy firms, investment banks and other institutions in 
promoting schemes aimed at obtaining abusive tax gains.  
Tax avoidance can be a lucrative global industry and it can be assumed that there are 
professionals who ensure that, even though the letter of the law is respected, creative and 
immoral ways of perverting the spirit of the law can be found in order to avoid tax.34 
Regardless of the variety of channels used by multinational companies to shift their 
profts, there exits evidence that the use of financial policies35 plays an important role in this 
process, specifically debt-shifting between multinational enterprises and hybrid financial 
instruments. 
 Profit-shifting via debt-fiancing 3.
The amount of debt in a group entity may be altered by multinational groups via intra-
group financing and advantageous tax results can be achieved as a result. Academic studies 
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 Sousa, “O planeamento fiscal abusivo. O Decreto-lei 29/2008 de 25 de Fevereiro e os esquemas de planeamento fiscal abusivo.”, 
Working papers TributariUM, June 2012. 
33
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and Administration. 
34
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35
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supported by debt instead of equity, and how much of their earnings should be retained for internal equity finance, instead of paying 
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have considered the impact of tax rules on the location of debt and it has been acknowledged 
that groups are able to multiply the level of debt at the level of individual group entities by 
way of intra-group financing.36 
In accordance with Action 4 of the BEPS project, base erosion and profit shifting risks 
may appear in three possible situations: “(i) groups placing higher levels of third party debt in 
high tax jurisdictions; (ii) groups using intra-group loans to generate interest deductions in 
excess of the group’s actual third party interest expense; and (iii) groups using third party or 
intra-group financing to fund the generation of tax exempt income.”37 
When these possibilities are exploited by multinational groups, competitive distortions 
may occur between groups operating at an international level and those performing in the 
domestic market. This may negatively impact capital ownership neutrality, establishing a tax 
preference for assets to be held by multinational groups rather than by domestic ones. 
Research shows that groups tend to leverage more debt in subsidiaries situated in high 
tax-jurisdictions38 and that debt shifting does not only affect developed countries but also 
developing ones, which, may end up more exposed to these risks39, partially because in these 
countries production costs are usually lower but the tax on business income is generally high, 
so that makes up for finance subsidiaries located in jurisdictions with high tax rates through 
debt, making use of the interest deductions to relieve the tax burden.  
Studies have also shown that thin capitalization is firmly related to multinational 
groups and that foreign companies use more debt when compared to domestically-owned 
ones.40 Additional debt may be provided through both intra-group and third party debt, with 
intra-group loans typically used in cases where the borrowing costs on third party debt are 
high.41 
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In chapter II, this research will show how countries are responding to this 
phenomenon and will look at the OECD work on BEPS through interest deduction, 
specifically at Action 4. 
 How hybrid financial instruments can affect tax planning 4.
International capital markets have been facing the emergence of new financial 
instruments and techniques. Globalization and technological changes have played a leading 
role, making the global securities market closer. As markets become less distinct and more 
mixed, capital-raising exercises are increasingly seen on an international basis rather than on a 
merely domestic one.  
New financing techniques for both debt and equity are growing unexpectedly fast in 
an attempt to meet the needs of sophisticated investors. Investors are now provided with a 
more complex package, which usually entails the merging of the more conventional features 
of debt and equity. 
A hybrid financial instrument can be defined as a security including two elements, 
equity and debt, which could be described as either a bond with equity characteristics or a 
share with debt features.42 These instruments may have the typical legal features of the one 
category but the economic features of the other or they can allow for the possibility of 
converting the investment from one form to another.43 When investing in hybrid instruments, 
investors may either get a fixed or floating rate of return and payment returns may come in 
the form of interest or dividends.  
Within the range of hybrid financial products44, convertible bonds and convertible 
preferred shares are relevant examples due to its extensive use. Convertible bonds usually can 
be converted by the holder into a predetermined number of shares in the issuing company. 
When first issued, they usually function like common bonds but with a relatively lower 
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 Gallo, “Drawing the Borderline between Debt and Equity in Tax Treaty Law (Hybrid Finance)”, in International Group Financing and 
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interest rate.45 The decision to convert is generally influenced by the performance of the 
common stock. The investor may be also stuck with the bond’s initial return- which is usually 
below the return that a non-convertible would get46 if the underlying company has a poor 
performance. 
Preferred convertible shares may pay dividends at a fixed or floating rate before 
common stock dividends are paid, and can be exchanged for common shares of the company 
in question. In this case, investors may either hold debt-like preferred equity or have the 
option of converting into common equity.47 The decision to convert preference shares into 
common ones is usually dependent on the performance of the common shares- investors will 
be interested in the conversion when they can gain from a rise in the price of the common 
shares.  
Although preference shares may not come together with the right to vote, they usually 
involve other advantages which may include the fact that preferred shareholders receive 
dividends before common shareholders; in case of insolvency the preference shareholders 
receive priority of payment in relation to common shareholders; and, while preferred 
shareholders usually receive dividends on a regular basis, common shareholders  only receive 
dividends when the board of directors decides to issue them.48  
Since preferred shares are less volatile than the regular ones, they tend to have certain 
similarities with fixed-income securities. Convertibles may offer more income potential than 
regular bonds, however there is still the possibility that they lose value if the underlying 
company has a poor performance. 
In spite of the fact that hybrid instruments can be issued for various reasons, which 
may not be tax related, taxation issues usually carry a significant weight on management’s 
finance decisions considering hybrid instruments. This is mainly due to the fact that hybrid 
instruments, in most countries, can only be treated as equity or debt, which means that the 
yield is either treated as profit distribution or as interest. This classification is relevant 
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because it will determine if the issuer can treat the yield as tax-deductible and it will define, in 
some cases, if the received payments from the respective instrument are exempt from tax.49 
In cross border activities, income from hybrid instruments may be regarded as debt in 
the source state and as equity in the country of residence of the shareholder and the contrary is 
also possible.50 In this case, the source state would allow for a deduction of the return on the 
investment, and the state of residence of the shareholder would confer a tax exemption on the 
same return.  
On the contrary, that is, when a hybrid is treated as equity in the source state and as 
debt in the shareholder’s state of residence, its return will be treated in the source state as a 
non-deductible profit distribution, whereas in the country of the shareholder’s residence, the 
return will be treated as a taxable interest payment. Presuming that anti-avoidance rules are 
not considered, situations of double non-taxation or double taxation may occur as a result. 
Hybrid mismatch arrangements aim at exploiting differences in the tax treatment of 
instruments, entities or transfers between two or more countries and they have been 
confronted by tax administrations in many states. In terms of their results, these hybrid 
mismatch arrangements may originate “double non-taxation” that may not be intended by 
either country, or may rather give rise to a tax deferral which if maintained over various years 
is economically equivalent to double non-taxation. Concerns in relation to distortions caused 
by double taxation are as important as concerns respecting unintended double non-taxation.51 
Hybrid mismatch arrangements usually aim at achieving one of the following results: 
“(i) the multiple deduction of the same expense in different countries, (ii) the deduction of a 
payment in the country of the payer without a corresponding inclusion in the country of the 
payee and (iii) multiple tax credits for a single amount of foreign tax paid”.52  In this way, 
hybrid mismatch arrangements may considerably reduce the overall tax for taxpayers and 
raise several tax policy issues, affecting, for example, tax revenue, competition, economic 
efficiency, transparency and fairness.  
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 Hybrid Finance in the OECD-MC: Articles 10 (dividends) and 11(interest) 5.
International tax treaties have played a fundamental role in providing relief from 
double taxation. Hence, their main objective is to improve cross-border activities through the 
elimination of double taxation. A double tax treaty may also serve other purposes as 
preventing tax avoidance and evasion, avoiding cases of double non-taxation and preventing 
discrimination. 
When negotiating tax treaties, countries usually rely on two model treaties: one 
prepared by the OECD: the Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital; and the other 
by the United Nations: the UN Model Double Taxation Convention. Both models divide 
taxing rights on cross-border investment and business activities. The OECD treaty shifts more 
taxing powers to capital exporting countries whereas the UN treaty reserves more for capital 
importing countries.53 Tax treaties following the OECD model convention severely limit the 
exercise of source jurisdiction. 
This research analyses the treatment of hybrid instruments in light of the standards 
envisaged in the OECD MC, essentially because this model forms the basis of the majority of 
double tax treaties currently in force.54 
In most cases, the income from hybrid instruments either qualifies as dividends or as 
interest in accordance with the OECD MC. In this way, the focus lies in articles 10 
(dividends) and 11 (interest) of the MC. 
The OECD reduces the right of the source state to charge withholding tax, limiting the 
amount that the source state can levy. Accordingly, article 10 limits the withholding tax to 5% 
if the concerned entities are related and 15% in other cases; and article 11 limits the 
withholding tax to 10%. 
Article 10 (3) of the OECD-MC defines the term dividends in the following manner: 
“The term “dividends” as used in this Article means income from shares, 
“jouissance” shares or “jouissance” rights, mining shares, founders’ shares or other rights 
not being debt-claims, participating in profits, as well as income from other corporate rights, 
which is subjected to the same taxation treatment as income from shares by the laws of the 
State of which the company making the distribution is a resident.” 
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In its last sentence, article 10 (3) makes reference to the national law of the source 
state and, thus, this law becomes part of the treaty between the two contracting states. It may 
be debated whether this reference to national law comprises the entire definition of dividends 
or if it only includes income from other corporate rights as mentioned in the second part of 
the article. 
According to the wording of article 10, this reference to national law does not include 
the types of income listed in the first part of the definition, that is, “income from shares, 
“jouissance” shares or “jouissance” rights, mining shares, founders’ shares or other rights not 
being debt-claims, participating in profits” have to be interpreted autonomously from the 
national law of the source state. As a result, one may assume that only income from other 
corporate rights is influenced by reference to the law of the source state.55 The term corporate 
right as used in the treaty should be interpreted independently from the national law of the 
source state.  
An investment is usually considered to include a corporate right when the investor 
recognizes the possible risk of the loss of the investment in a way comparable to the risk that 
is supported by a common shareholder.56 In accordance with the leading German doctrine, 
only when the investment involves a participation in the profits as well as a participation in 
the liquidation proceeds of the issuing company, does it constitute a corporate right.57 
Furthermore, the use of the term "other" corporate rights may indicate that all income 
items listed in article 10 (3) constitute corporate rights. Subsequently, the income from a 
hybrid instrument, whether included in the first or second part of the definition, will only be 
classified as dividend if the hybrid instrument in question comprises a corporate right under 
the Convention.58 
Art 11 (3) of the OECD-MC provides the definition of the term interest. It reads as 
follows: 
“The term "interest" as used in this Article means income from debt-claims of every 
kind, whether or not secured by mortgage and whether or not carrying a right to participate 
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in the debtor's profits, and in particular, income from government securities and income from 
bonds or debentures, including premiums and prizes attaching to such securities, bonds or 
debentures. Penalty charges for late payment shall not be regarded as interest for the purpose 
of this Article.” 
Article 11 (3) makes no reference to the national law of either contracting state and, as 
such, it may be assumed as a final and universal definition of interest, which has to be 
interpreted independently of the national law of the contracting states.59 
The term "income from debt-claims of every kind" is an essential element of the 
interest definition established in article 11 (3). However, the term is not expressly defined 
either in the oecd-mc or in the oecd-com, but only complemented by a list of examples of 
certain types of debt-claims (government securities and income from bonds or debentures). 
In this way, article 11 (3) has a broad character and does not include restrictions to the 
term interest. However, what the leading doctrine considers is that interest reflects the cost of 
doing business by making capital available. Regarding hybrid finance, a problem may arise 
because on the one hand dividends, in accordance with article 10, also constitute 
remunerations in response to an injection of capital and, on the other, debt claims which 
involve the "right to participate in the debtors profits" are specifically included in the interest 
definition of article 11 (3). 
Accordingly, articles 10 (3) and 11 (3) may be related but under paragraph 19 of the 
OECD commentary on article 11 any income that integrates article 10 (3) cannot be included 
in article 11 (3), which may end up partially clarifying the concept of interest.60 Thus, 
according to the prevailing doctrine, mutual exclusivity is given to the terms income from 
corporate rights and income from debt-claims, in the sense that dividends cannot fall under 
article 11 (3) even if they were qualified as interest. 
From a double tax convention perspective, hybrid instruments that include a profit-
participation right or the right to participate in the liquidation proceeds of the issuing 
company, do not normally constitute interest in terms of article 11(3), but they are rather 
considered a corporate right under article 10(3). In the same way, hybrid instruments that 
encompass a participation in the entrepreneurial risk only through a profit participating right- 
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for instance, if the payment on a debt claim is dependent on profits being made- do not 
usually qualify as dividend but rather as interest in line with article 11(3).61 
The fundamental criterion to distinguish article 10 from article 11 is, thus, the 
presence of a corporate right.62 However, these criteria are not clearly defined by the OECD. 
Concerning hybrid instruments and their multitude of features with respect to participation in 
the entrepreneurial risk, they can lead to situations where the contracting states may not agree 
on the characteristics to qualify a particular hybrid instrument as a corporate right and, 
therefore, as dividends. 
The trend is that countries first follow the income classification provided for in their 
national laws which, in certain cases, may not correspond to the classification of the other 
contracting state. This can put the taxpayer in a situation where one state applies Article 10 
whereas the other employs article 11, which, depending on the national laws and double 
taxation treaties, can lead to double taxation or non-double taxation of the income concerned.  
Even in the presence of a tax treaty, double taxation may occur if the contracting state 
interprets a provision of the treaty in a different manner or qualifies the same income in a 
different way. The Mutual Agreement Procedure, which is established in article 25 of the 
OECD-MC, is an instrument provided by tax treaties which seeks to solve disputes involving 
the application and interpretation of tax treaties. Accordingly, when states that have signed a 
treaty interpret a term written in it in a different way, as may happen in the case of hybrid 
instruments, the MAP procedure can possibly lead to a solution.63 
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 Cross Border Hybrid Finance within the European Union: Parent and 6.
Subsidiary Directive (PSD) and Interest and Royalties Directive (IRD) 
In the history of the European Union, directives have been an important tool used by 
the Council in aligning the national laws of the member states with the requirements of a 
common internal market within the EU.Regarding the taxation of cross-border hybrid finance, 
the PSD64 and the IRD65 are the most relevant of these directives: the first one deals with the 
payment of dividends and the second involves the payment of interest and royalties between 
related companies. These directives have been implemented by most member states. 
The PSD determines that the residence state of the parent company shall refrain from 
taxing distributed profits (article 4 (1)) and that the profits that the subsidiary distributes to the 
parent company should be exempt from withholding tax. The PSD, however, does not include 
a definition of the term profits but merely determines that the member state shall apply this 
directive to distributions of profits (article 1 (1), 90/435/ECC). 
The Council of the European Union, in the introduction to the PSD, establishes that 
the purpose of the directive is to “exempt dividends and other profit distributions paid by 
subsidiary companies to their parent companies from withholding taxes and to eliminate 
double taxation of such income at the level of the parent company”. Distributive profits, in 
which dividends are included, have a broader scope and can be interpreted to cover any 
payment arising from the company-shareholder relationship or association between 
companies.66 It seems that the directive leaves it to the member states and their national laws 
to decide what profits integrate the scope of the national implementation of the directive. 
In the context of hybrid financing, the main goal of the PSD is to eliminate double 
taxation regarding the relationship between parent companies and their subsidiaries and, thus, 
it seems reasonable to assume that the PSD should be applied in these situations. The return 
from hybrid instruments that classifies as equity investment is generally subject to the benefits 
conferred by the directive. This means that the benefits of the PSD should be applied to 
payments from hybrid instruments at national level if the member state in question treats 
these payments as dividends in accordance with its national tax law. 
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Regarding the state of residence of the parent company, it may be questioned if it has 
to confer the benefits provided in the directive symmetrically with the source state, thus 
accepting the classification made by the latter.67 If the state of residence of the parent 
company does not confer the benefits of the PSD, either because it adopts a different 
interpretation of the term profit distribution or because it classifies income as interest 
(classification conflict), it is possible that the recipient state will levy tax on profits distributed 
by the subsidiary, although the source state may choose to apply the PSD. It is widely 
accepted that it cannot be required to the state of residence of the parent company to accept 
the classification made by the source state68 and, because of that, the possibility of double 
taxation may remain despite the directive. 
The term interest in the IRD is defined as in article 11(3) of the OECD-MC. The IRS 
includes a broad definition of the term interest ("income from debt -claims of any kind"), 
which may end up comprising almost any type of hybrid instrument (participation bonds, 
profit-participating loans, warrant bonds, preference shares as well as forms of jouissance 
rights and silent partnerships). At the same time, the IRD allows member states not to confer 
the benefits of the Directive in four cases established in article 4, enabling them to narrow the 
application of the directive. For this analysis, articles 4 (a) and 4 (b) are of particular 
relevance. 
Article 4 (a) of the IRD allows the source state to deny the benefits of the directive on 
payments that are treated as a distribution of profits or as a repayment of capital in accordance 
with its national law. With regard to hybrid finance, this provision may be particularly 
relevant given that it is unclear whether such payments fall within the scope of application of 
the PSD. If the option of article 4(a) is executed and provided the other requirements are met, 
these payments should fall under the scope of application of the PSD.  
Assuming that all payments that are classified as a profit distribution under the tax law 
of the source state integrate the scope of the PSD, the question that may arise is what happens 
if the source state does not apply the option of article 4 (a) of the IRD and if these payments 
are covered by the scope of both directives. This would not be a relevant issue given that both 
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directives provide an exemption from any withholding tax on payments and, therefore, the 
impact on the tax burden would be the same. 69 
Article 4 (b) allows the "exemption of debt-claims which carry the right to participate 
in the debtor's profits." In this way, the source state has the option to exclude many of the 
hybrid instruments from the application scope of the IRD (participation bonds, profit-
participating loans, warrant bonds, preference shares as well as forms of jouissance rights and 
silent partnerships). It is possible that the source state may exempt certain hybrid instruments 
from the benefits of both directives by first qualifying them as debt on a national level, thus 
exempting them from the benefits of the PSD, and then using the option in article 4 (b) to 
exempt them from the benefits of the IRD. 
Eberhartinger and Six, argue that article 4 (b) should only apply to situations where 
the treatment given under the national tax law corresponds to the general definition of interest 
present in article 2 (1) of the Directive.70 In this case, member states may decide to deny the 
benefits of the directive on payments of certain financial products, while still qualifying these 
same payments as interest under their national tax laws. Thus, article 4 may frustrate the 
overall IRD objective of elimination of double taxation on the interest payments. 
According to Distaso and Russo, it is possible that the intention behind these 
provisions is to give an instrument for member states to eliminate situations of double non-
taxation, excluding instruments that create a tax deduction on the source state at the same time 
that they give rise to a taxation exemption of the respective income because, for example, the 
state of residence of the parent company treats the income as dividends and applies the PSD.71 
Assuming that this may be the reasoning of the article, this provision may not be 
entirely appropriate given that the directive affects not only payments between a pair of 
member states but all payments within the scope of its application, and that article 4 does not 
contain reference to the treatment that is given to payments in the recipient country.72As a 
result, the source state may exclude payments from the scope of the directive which are 
treated as interest in the two states, thus leading to situations of double taxation. 
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From this analysis it is possible to conclude that both directives allow for the 
possibility of member states to exclude some hybrid instruments from the benefits conferred 
by both directives and that these directives, as they presently stand, fail to assure single 
taxation. 
Although the directives deal with cross border intra-group finance, the fact is that EU 
tax law has not been able to entirely cover hybrid financing in a manner that guarantees single 
taxation. The main reason for this is that the correlation between the two directives is not 
always straightforward. Therefore, a clear-cut delimitation between dividends and interest 
appears as a proper response to this problem. Despite the fact that different measures are 
applied in order to avoid double taxation and to ensure single taxation, cases of double 
taxation and double non- taxation are still possible. 
The tax treatment of a certain hybrid instrument is widely dependent on the 
classification and interpretation made by the two countries involved. Therefore, taxpayers 
face significant legal uncertainty with respect to the fiscal consequences deriving from the use 
of hybrid instruments in cross border intra group finance. 
 Interim conclusions 7.
Although governments try to create tax systems that, on the one hand, provide the best 
environment for companies and, on the other, ensure the sustainability of the welfare state, 
almost none of them ensure that the principle of fiscal neutrality is incorporated in practice. 
The different tax treatment of debt and equity is a striking example of this failure. 
Financing decisions seek to optimize costs and, in the case of taxes, the deductibility 
of interest is a crucial factor in giving preference to debt over equity. So long as there is a tax 
benefit to prefer one form of finance over the other, firms will feel motivated to use it. 
However, this tax-bias towards debt financing may pose some risks such as distortions 
in the capital structure of companies and profit-shifting via transfer of debt. In order to 
preserve their tax bases, countries have been adopting measures to mitigate this problem. The 
following chapter will address policy responses to correct the debt bias problem evidenced in 
current tax systems. 
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Part II- Policy options to correct the debt bias 
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 Thin Capitalization 1.
Thin capitalization can be defined as a phenomenon that is evidenced by the existence 
of a marked disproportion between a company’s equity capital and its level of debt towards 
capital holders or with other companies with which there are special relations.73 A company is 
considered to be “thinly capitalized” when it has a high proportion of debt compared to its 
equity capital. The amount of loans that a company would be able to obtain from independent 
entities is a comparative standard often used. 
Thin capitalization rules establish a limitation on the tax deductibility of interest 
expenses that are considered excessive. In this way, these rules seek to limit the achievement 
of tax advantages through debt financing and can exist in different forms. There are several 
mechanisms that are used to implement thin capitalization rules, such as fixed-debt ratios; 
earnings stripping rules; safe haven rules combined with the possibility of taxpayers 
demonstrating that another debt-equity ratio is adequate in a specific case; and application of 
the arm's length principle to define the debt-equity ratio that is allowed.74 
The purpose of such rules is to prevent improper shifting of income to the jurisdiction 
of the creditor, and the deduction of interest expenses as regards borrowings that are granted 
in better conditions than those granted to non-related parties. Basically, these rules are 
intended to prevent the erosion of the tax base that can lead to revenue losses. 
There exists evidence that international groups use third party and related party 
interest as a profit-shifting technique misaligning interest deductions with taxable economic 
activity. Thin capitalization has been a popular tax planning method used by international 
groups especially due to the tax treatment differences that apply to debt and equity in most 
countries. 
Despite the fact the that their form may vary from country to country, a general feature 
of thin capitalization rules is that the interest deduction is denied for loans from foreign 
affiliates if the debt- equity ratio is above the threshold established. 
The context of these rules may differ from the perspective of the debt-to-equity ratio 
or the safe haven; the consequences of the application of the thin capitalization rules, that is, if 
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the tax system only denies the deduction of excessive interest expenses or if it also 
recharacterizes the excess amount as dividends and tax it accordingly; and the type of loans 
that may be considered to define the application of the general interest limitation rule (some 
EU member states restrict the application of the provision to loans granted by shareholders or 
related parties, whereas others extend its application to all types of loans regardless of 
whether there is a relation between the debtor and the creditor or not.75 
Studies have suggested that thin capitalization is, in fact, an important phenomenon at 
the international level. 76 In 2003, Altshuler and Grubert, based on data available from the 
USA, observed that an increase of 1% in the tax rate of foreign subsidiaries of US 
multinational groups leads to an increase of 0.4% in the debt-to-equity ratio of those 
subsidiaries.77Desai, Foley, and Hines also concluded that a 10% higher tax rate can give rise 
to an increase of 3 to 5% in the debt-to-equity ratio.78 
In 2006, Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodeme, taking into account data collected from 
more than 90,000 affiliates across thirty-one European countries, concluded that a 0.06% 
higher effective tax rate in the country of the subsidiary company raises its debt/equity ratio 
by 1.4%.79 
A previous survey conducted by Weichenrieder in 1996, established that in the early 
1990s (before thin capitalization rules were introduced in Germany), over three quarters of 
German inbound foreign direct investment included loans, while the German investment 
abroad mainly comprised equity financing.80 
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The studies mentioned above suggest that this general phenomenon entails negative 
consequences in respect of collected revenue and, as a result, the introduction of thin 
capitalization rules is rising within the EU and among OECD countries.81 
There are various policy options to mitigate the debt-bias problem, some of which 
have already (intentionally or unintentionally) been put in practice. For instance, a decrease in 
the corporate tax rates reduces the value of the tax shield for debt. The most common option 
has been the adoption of thin capitalization rules and their use has developed dramatically 
since the 1990s. A similar instrument, for example, is an earnings-stripping rule which seeks 
to limit the interest deductibility when the net interest expenses exceed a defined percentage 
of the EBITDA.  
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 The OECD treatment of intra-group financing: BEPS Action 4 2.
The BEPS project comprises the involvement of more than 80 countries, including 34 
OECD members, all members of the G20 and over 40 developing countries. The main 
purpose of their work is to find coherent and consistent solutions to fill the gaps in 
international tax rules that allow companies to legally but artificially shift their profits to low 
or no taxation jurisdictions. These instruments are developed and agreed upon by the 
governments of participating countries and constitute soft law instruments. They seek to treat 
cases of double non-taxation and also to improve the mechanisms to deal with cases of double 
taxation.82 Once these instruments are agreed upon, all participating countries can, in 
accordance with their legal and constitutional systems, implement them. 
In the sequence of the report "Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting" in 
February 2013, countries of the OECD and the G20 adopted a 15-point Action Plan to tackle 
beps in September 2013. The Action Plan includes 15 actions based on 3 fundamental pillars 
which include introducing coherence in the national provisions that impact cross-border 
activities, strengthening substance requirements in the existing international rules, and 
promoting certainty and transparency. 
This research will address Action 4 of BEPS which involves recommendations on best 
practices in the design of rules to avoid base erosion and profit shifting through the use of 
interest and payments economically equivalent to interest. 
Most countries treat interest as a deductible expense for tax purposes, but each country 
uses its own approach to define which expenses integrate the concept of interest and that are, 
therefore, deductible for tax purposes. Action 4 does not intend to propose a definition of 
interest to be applied by all countries, recognizing that there will remain differences between 
countries in relation to the items that are treated as deductible expenditure, and that countries 
will continue to apply their own definition of interest for other tax aims, for example, for 
withholding taxes. Action 4 suggests that there are benefits to countries in adopting a broader 
approach to the items that should be covered by these general interest limitation rules. 
According to Action 4, the best practice approach prescribes a fixed ratio rule which 
aims to limit interest deductions of an entity to a fixed percentage of its profit, which is 
measured through the use of earnings before taxes, interest, depreciation and amortization 
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(EBITDA) and taking into account tax numbers.83 The EBITDA approach aims to ensure that 
a portion of the entity’s profit is subject to taxation in the country. 
EBITDA is the recommended measure of earnings to be applied, however the best 
practice gives countries the possibility to adopt earnings-based rules before interest and taxes 
(EBIT) and, in exceptional cases, allows countries to employ a fixed ratio rule based on asset 
values instead of earnings. 
The fixed ratio rule is assumed by the OECD as a direct and relatively simple to apply 
rule aimed at ensuring that the interest deduction by an entity directly corresponds to its 
economic activity. This rule also relates these deductions with the taxable income of the 
entity, making it an efficient tool against tax planning. 
An efficient fixed ratio rule requires countries to establish the benchmark fixed ratio 
rule to a level that is adequate to combat beps but also taking into account the differences 
between countries in terms of their legal framework and economic environment. According to 
the OECD, it is recommended that countries establish their benchmark fixed ratio rule within 
a corridor of 10% to 30% considering certain factors. 
Action 4 recognizes that the fixed ratio rule may be a blind instrument in the sense that 
it does not consider the fact that groups that operate in different sectors may require different 
levels of leverage, and even within the same sector certain groups may be more leveraged due 
to non-tax reasons. If the benchmark fixed ratio rule is established at a level effective enough 
to combat beps, it can cause double taxation for groups that are leveraged above this level.84 
In this way, the best practice approach gives countries the possibility to combine a 
fixed ratio rule with a group ratio rule that, in certain cases, allows an entity to deduct more 
interest expense. This group ratio rule can be established separately or as an integral part of a 
general provision, comprising both fixed ratio and group ratio rules. 
According to the group ratio rule, an entity exceeding the benchmark fixed ratio can 
deduct interest expenses up to the net the third party interest / EBITDA ratio of its group, 
when this is superior. Consequently, only the deduction of interest expenses that are above the 
levels provided by the fixed ratio rule or the group ratio rule will not be permitted. 
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Different group ratio rules, such as those using asset-based ratios can be applied as 
long as they only allow an entity to exceed the benchmark fixed ratio when it is possible to 
prove that a certain financial ratio is in conformity with that of its group. 
A country may also choose to use a fixed ratio rule alone and, when a country does not 
apply the group ratio rule, it should employ, without discrimination, the fixed ratio rule to 
entities in both multinational and domestic groups. The best practice approach suggests that 
countries should apply the fixed ratio rule by making use of a benchmark ratio which is low 
enough to tackle beps. 
With the objective of excluding entities that represent the lowest risk from the scope 
of the general interest limitation rule, the best practice approach suggests that a country may 
apply a de minimis threshold centered on the monetary value of the interest expense of all 
entities in the local goup. In this case, no restrictions apply to the deduction of interest of 
entities that are below this limit. For groups that have more than one entity in the country, this 
limit should consider the total interest expense of the entire local group, covering all entities 
in that country. When a rule is applied to the level of an individual entity, it is recommended 
that a country should adopt anti-fragmentation rules to restrict a group’s ability to avoid the 
application of the interest limitation rule by establishing various entities, each one falling 
below the limit defined by the rule.85 
The rules that relate interest deduction to EBITDA may raise questions when the 
interest expense of an entity and earnings arise in different periods. This may be a 
consequence of the volatility of earnings which comprises the ability of an entity to deduct 
interest changes from year to year, or because the entity has incurred interest expense to 
finance an investment that will only give rise to gains in a subsequent period.86 To alleviate 
the impact of these issues, a country may allow entities to carry forward disallowed interest 
expense or interest unused capacity. 
The application of carry forward and carry back provisions may result in clear benefits 
for entities by mitigating the risk of a permanent denial of interest expense in cases where 
interest expense and EBITDA emerge in distinct periods. However, it is recommended that 
countries include limits on the application of these carry forwards and carry backs to tackle 
beps risks. 
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The fixed ratio rule and the group ratio rule should be complemented by targeted rules 
aimed at protecting the integrity of the general interest limitation rule and addressing specific 
beps risks that may remain.87 
The fixed ratio rule and the group ratio rule may not be efficient rules to tackle beps 
involving interest in the banking and insurance sectors due to the particular characteristics 
surrounding these industries. 
Regarding the recipients of these rules, Action 4 determines that the best practice 
approach, as a minimum, should be applied to all entities forming part of a multinational 
group. A wider application is also possible including entities of a domestic group and / or 
standalone entities that are not part of a group.88 
An entity is considered to be part of a group, if it is directly or indirectly controlled by 
another company or if the entity constitutes a company that directly or indirectly controls one 
or more other entities. For a group to be considered multinational it has to operate in more 
than one jurisdiction, including through a permanent establishment. 
Entities integrating multinational groups represent a higher risk as regards base 
erosion and profit shifting. Nevertheless, a country can opt for the application of a broader 
fixed ratio rule in order to also include entities operating in domestic groups. This may be part 
of a wide approach to address BEPS in all entity types or may be in order to satisfy other 
policy objectives, such as to prevent competition issues between national and multinational 
groups, to reduce the tax bias in favour of debt financing, or to meet constitutional obligations 
with respect to the equal treatment of taxpayers. Particularly, countries that are EU member 
states will have to take EU legislation into account when implementing their national rules. 
A standalone entity refers to any entity not forming part of a group. Many of times, 
they are small entities which belong directly to an individual where there are no other entities 
under common control. In such cases, as a result of the small size of the entity and the 
absence of related parties, the beps risk concerning interest is expected to be comparatively 
low. There are cases, however, where these standalone entities can be robust entities held 
under complex holding structures involving trusts or partnerships, where there are a number 
of entities under the control of the same investors. In these situations, the beps risks may be 
similar to those represented by a group structure. 
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Countries are free to implement stricter standards than those proposed by the OECD 
for the purpose of combating beps or to achieve other fiscal policy objectives. Thus, the best 
practice approach can be complemented by general or specific interest limitation rules that a 
country considers adequate to mitigate the risks it may face. A country may adopt interest 
limitation rules that include broader fiscal policies such as reducing the tax bias towards debt 
financing.89 
Each country, in the implementation of the best practice approach, will need to 
consider the obligations in light of its constitution and the specific features of its general tax 
system. 
In summary, the OECD is committed to reducing the opportunities for tax avoidance 
by multinational companies that make use of internal financial structures to artificially reduce 
their taxes through inflated deduction of interest from taxable profits. Accordingly, it is 
recommended that countries introduce a limit on such interest deductions. The OECD 
suggests that the deduction of interest should be related to the profits made by the firm 
(EBITDA) in order to ensure that the deductibility of interest effectively corresponds to the 
economic activity of the company. It seems to me that the OECD recommendations are a 
strong contribution in addressing problems of double non-taxation or harmful competition. 
However, I think that these reccomendations should be made in a way that does not establish 
burdensome rules for financial transactions which are actually genuine and they should be 
consistently justified from an operational point of view.  
 Thin Capitalization Rules and tax treaty law: the arm’s length approach 3.
Thin capitalization and earnings stripping rules bring about some complex questions 
respecting tax treaty law. A fundamental question remains as to whether “rigid” thin 
capitalization approaches or earnings-stripping rules clash with the arm’s length principle 
(article 9 OECD MC).  
The arm’s length approach requires a fundamental question that needsto be answered, 
that being whether an independent entity would also have granted an identical volume and 
price for loans to the company. If the answer is affirmative, the enterprise meets the arm’s 
length criteria and is not deemed thinly capitalized. If not, the interest would be regarded as 
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excessive and not reflecting real market conditions and would, in most cases, be treated as 
dividend, making it a non-deductible item in calculating taxable income and, consequently, 
increasing the tax liability.90 
The UK, for example, exclusively applies an arm’s length approach to regulate 
financing structures which are excessively leveraged. Accordingly, it denies interest 
deductions exceeding a firm’s arm’s length debt capacity. However, if the UK company 
fulfils the arm’s length criteria, no profit adjustment is made. In general, countries applying 
such an approach are not infringing article 9. 
However, things might be slightly different with respect to debt-equity ratios and 
earnings stripping rules. 
Under the fixed ratio approach, the borrower’s debt-to-equity ratio is tested against a 
pre-established specified fixed ratio determined by the country of the debtor which, in some 
cases, may have been settled arbitrarily.91 These rules substantially differ among countries 
that have applied such an approach. Some of these rules merely affect intra-group debt 
financing, whereas others also take independent third-party loans into consideration. 
Moreover, the ratios may vary significantly between countries. US, Belgium, Spain and 
Denmark are examples of countries which apply debt-to-equity ratios. 
This fixed ratio approach may be rigid and may give rise to double taxation if the 
country of the lender does not grant relief for the corporate taxes paid on the non-deductible 
interest in the country of the borrower. In addition, the compatibility of such a rule with 
article 9 may be debatable. 
Like the fixed ratio rule, the safe harbour approach relies on a pre-established debt-to-
equity ratio with the difference that it gives an additional possibility to the debtor to explain 
the arm’s length nature of the debt when it exceeds the fixed debt-to-equity ratio. The 
borrower company may escape from the rigor of thin capitalization rules and its adverse 
consequences if it is successful in demonstrating that the arm’s length criteria is satisfied even 
if the interest deduction exceeds the debt-to-equity ratios. The safe harbour mechanism differs 
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from the strict fixed-ratio rule in the sense that this mechanism is more flexible since it is 
related to the arm’s length principle and, normally in line with article 9. 
The fixed ratio rule and the safe harbour approach represent tradicional thin 
capitalization rules which imply a balance sheet test (testing the debt-to-equity ratio). Some 
countries have recently moved from those traditional rules to earnings stripping rules, which 
rely on the company’s income ratio. Such rules limit the interest deduction to a percentage of 
the EBITDA or similar criteria. Given that earnings stripping rules relate the deduction of 
interest to EBITDA, they are based on an income test instead of a balance sheet test. This 
approach is in line with the OECD recommendations provided for in BEPS Action 4. 
Germany, Portugal and Italy represent examples of countries that shifted to earnings stripping 
rules. 
Article 9 of the OECD-MC provides the basis for tax treaty provisions concerning 
transfer pricing and establishes the use of the arm’s length principle to treat the transactions 
between associated companies as if they were conducted between unrelated parties.  
Article 9 (1) determines that the profits made by a company with its associated 
enterprises can be adjusted to the same level as it would have earned if it dealt with an 
independent company at arm's length. Contrarily, no profit adjustment of related enterprises is 
justified where the transactions between such enterprises have occured under normal open 
market commercial conditions, for example, on an arm’s length basis.  
An adequate profit adjustment may be made in the debtor’s state in conformity with 
article 9 when the transaction between associated companies is not in accordance with the 
arm's length principle. In this way, article 9(1) allows for amounts not in line with the arm's 
length principle to be included in a company’s profit. Article 9 (2) acknowledges a 
corresponding adjustment in the creditor’s state of residence for the purpose of preventing 
double taxation. 
Under the arm's length principle, as a rule, interest is deductible, however, non-arm’s 
length interest is normally not deductible and may receive a range of different treatments. In 
this context, three types of rules may be applied at a national level: it is possible to establish 
an interest rate adjustment, according to which only a disallowance of the deduction is 
applied; to establish an interest-rate adjustment according to which the adjusted interest 
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payment is reclassified as a distribution of dividends; or to establish a reclassification of the 
loan as an equity contribution.92 
The next question to be addressed is if article 9(1) as it stands is relevant to decide 
whether a firm’s debt may be reclassified as equity for tax purposes. The OECD Thin 
Capitalization Report answers this question in the affirmative by stating that article 9 is 
relevant for the thin capitalization issue.93 
According to the OECD Commentary on article 9, article 9 (1) is relevant not only to 
test the arm’s length  nature of the interest rate, but also to assess whether a loan can, at first 
glance, be considered as equity for tax purposes.94 Thus, the OECD has considered that article 
9 (1) is also pertinent for the volume of the loan. 
Academic literature has criticized this suggestion of the OECD. It is accepted that 
article 9 (1) allows the tax authorities of the borrower's state to adjust the profits if the interest 
rate is not at arm's length. However, what is not accepted by the opposing view is that the 
article allows the reclassification of debt into equity.95  
This argument is based on textual interpretation. It is argued that Article 9 (1) refers to 
"conditions (...) made or imposed between two enterprises in their (...) financial 
relationships." In accordance with the opposing view, the word "condition" involves a narrow 
scope and relates to the terms of a contract (for example, interest rates, payment terms, etc.).In 
this way, the wording of article 9 (1) would not allow the consideration of the implied 
financial relations (i.e. the volume of debt financing) and therefore would not allow the tax 
authorities to question if an independent company under comparable conditions would incur 
in such a loan and, thus, to reclassify the loan as equity.96 
The historical background of the article is an argument which is also mentioned to 
sustain this position. After some linguistic clarification, article 5 of the League of Nations 
Model Convention of 1933 became article 9 of the OECD Model in 1963. It is argued that at 
this time the original drafters did not take into account the issue of thin capitalization. For 
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these reasons, many scholars have disagreed with the OECD position in relation to such loan 
recharacterization.97 
The followers of the OECD position, however, do not embrace such a restrictive 
textual interpretation. De Broe, for example, asserts that the choice between debt and equity 
financing is encompassed in the term "conditions made or imposed in their financial 
relations." Also, article 9 (1) allows profit adjustments for "any profits which would have 
accrued, but have not by reason of those conditions.”98 
According to this interpretation, the authors of the provision did not have a restrictive 
intention in mind and, therefore, a flexible interpretation is required. While it may be true that 
the original drafters did not consider the issue of thin capitalization (since at that time it was 
not deemed an important question), the interpreting scope should not be restricted to the 
specific profit-shifting techniques that the authors had in mind.  
Moreover, the principle of effectiveness prescribes that a treaty shall be interpreted in 
a practical way over time in order to allow new phenomena to be included in the treaty. This 
may include software, new financial instruments, e-commerce, etc. A restrictive interpretation 
would not be enough to include new phenomena that may appear in the future and could also 
lead to double taxation. Thus, article 9 (1) should be interpreted broadly. 
Furthermore, since it is widely accepted that tax treaties do not create tax 
responsibility, a legal base in the national laws is necessary in order to make profit 
adjustments among associated enterprises.99 The legal basis in national law as regards thin 
capitalization rules can give rise to difficulties when, for example, a state makes a profit 
adjustment that is in conformity with the tax treaty and domestic law, but another state lacks 
national rules to make the corresponding adjustment. This situation could lead to double 
taxation. 
From this analysis we may conclude that article 9 functions as the general basis for the 
application of transfer pricing throughout tax treaties. Other provisions relating to transfer 
pricing and the application of the arm’s length principle rely on the authoritative statements of 
article 9. Therefore, the article can be regarded as a lex generalis. The next question to be 
dealt with is its relation with article 11(6) of the OECD MC. 
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As mentioned before in this research, article 11 of the OECD MC allocates the right to 
levy taxes on interest payments. Under article 11(6) it is possible to make a rate adjustment in 
cases where interest is deemed excessive. However, article 11 (6) only applies where such 
excessive interest is paid due to a special relationship between the debtor and the creditor and 
only with respect to interest payments that exceed an arm's length payment.100 
Article 11 (6) constitutes a lex specialis with respect to article 9 in the sense that 
article 11 (6) is a special rule which limits the application of article 11101. The intention of 
article 11 (6) can be acknowledged in the Introductory Report of the Draft OECD MC of 
1963, which describes the provision as a safeguard clause dealing with excessive interest 
payments.102 
The goal of article 11 (6) is related to the extensive treaty definition of interest 
contained in article 11 (3). Within this broad definition and in the absence of article 11 (6), 
states would not have the possibility to refuse the classification of an excessive interest 
payment as an interest payment even if it exceeded the arm’s length payment of interest. If 
article 11 (6) was not included in a tax treaty this would mean that states would have to 
continue to treat excessive interest payment as an interest payment, since it would be covered 
by the definition provided by article 11 (3).103 
In the context of tax treaty law, the definitions of dividend and interest have proven to 
be relevant for the application of other provisions of the treaty. With respect to tax treaty law 
and national thin capitalization rules, the OECD's view is that article 10 (3) does not preclude 
a reclassification of interest due to thin capitalization rules.104 However, the reclassification is 
allowed only to the extent that the lender effectively shares the risks incurred by the debtor 
company on a particular loan. Considering that this criterion is fulfilled, the reclassified 
payment may be treated as income from “other corporate rights”, falling under article 10 (3).  
The debtor state which applies thin capitalization rules can consider the excessive 
amount as dividend for all treaty purposes or it may simply not allow the deduction of 
excessive interest and continue to treat the payment as interest. Regarding the creditor state, it 
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may either agree with the disallowed interest deduction or reclassified interest payment made 
by the debtor state providing relief from double taxation, or it can refuse the adjustment or 
reclassification and, in this case, double taxation may persist.105 
In cases where a debtor state does not allow an interest deduction for an amount that is 
not in accordance with the arm's length, the treaty provisions lead to an acceptable adjustment 
considering the limits provided for in article 10 (3). In this way, the disallowed interest 
deduction can then be treated as a dividend for purposes of the treaty. On the contrary, when 
an interest deduction does not allow for an amount that is in line with the arm's length 
principle, it continues to be treated as interest for treaty purposes. 
The criterion to determine if the treaty definition of dividend referred to in article 10 
(3) includes a reclassification also requires the creditor state, in principle, to accept the 
national thin capitalization rules of the debtor’s state when the creditor shares the risks 
incurred by the debtor company.  
This position and the subsequent treatment that should be given by the lender State is 
included in the OECD Commentary which states that, when the condition of sharing the risks 
is met, the reclassified amount may be taxed by the debtor state as a distribution of dividends 
and the amount is included in the taxable profits of the debtor.106 Accordingly, the lender state 
has to provide relief from double taxation as if the reclassified amount were in fact a dividend 
distribution. The structure of the treaty therefore allows adjustments and reclassifications 
respecting the limits of the arm’s length principle and expects that the creditor state will 
accept those in a similar manner. 
The vision of the OECD as regards the acceptance by the creditor state of the 
adjustments made by the debtor state based on national thin capitalization rules is not 
embraced by all creditor states. Research has shown that lender states generally do not feel 
bound by the reclassification made by the debtor state and, as such, continue to treat the 
payment as interest for national tax purposes.107  
This position of creditor states may give rise to double taxation, although, here the 
issue of double taxation is not considered to be very significant. Many states do not reclassify 
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the non-arm’s length interest payments; instead they do not allow a deduction from the 
debtor's profits. In the EU, for example, reclassified interest payments are not subject to 
dividend tax withholding as a result of the Parent and Subsidiary Directive. 
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 Thin Capitalization Rules and EU Law 4.
This section will analyse the compatibility of some national thin capitalization 
provisions with the EU Law, especially with the EU fundamental freedoms. 
The TFEU contemplates five fundamental freedoms, which include the free movement 
of goods (article 28 et seq.), the free movement of workers (article 45), the freedom of 
establishment (article 49), the free movement of services (article 56), and the free movement 
of capital (article 63), in order to meet the target of a common internal market.108The 
fundamental freedoms which are likely to be associated with thin capitalization rules are the 
freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital. 
The CJEU has interpreted the freedom of establishment as to apply in cases where the 
shareholder or investor exerts a significant influence on the decisions of an enterprise 
allowing him to define the activities of the company.109 In the context of the free movement 
of capital, the CJEU has interpreted it as applicable in situations where an investor, through a 
shareholding or the acquisition of securities on the capital market, has a direct investment that 
takes the form of participation in a company.110 
The TFEU does not determine in which way these freedoms should interact with each 
other in situations where a national law breaches more than one freedom at the same time. In 
this context, The CJEU has accepted two different approaches to deal with cases where the 
freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital may be exposed to a restriction: 
the priority or hierarchy approach111, which establishes that the free movement of capital 
should only be considered in cases where the freedom of establishment is not applicable; and 
the parallel approach112 which includes the concurrent application of both freedoms. The 
application of both freedoms in parallel is particularly relevant in the case of the free 
movement of capital given that it is the only freedom that comprises an external dimension.113 
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With regard to intra-EU cases, the application of the priority approach may not entail 
any consequences given that shareholders will always be protected against thin capitalization 
rules which involve restrictions or discrimination, regardless of the fundamental freedom that 
the CJEU may apply. However, the consequences are not the same with respect to non-EU 
countries because only the free movement of capital comprises an external dimension and, as 
such, if this freedom does not apply, but only the freedom of establishment, third countries 
are not protected against any restriction, which might result from the application of the thin 
capitalization rules. 
Due to the possible application in the future of the parallel approach by the CJEU to 
the analysis of these issues, parent companies which are resident in third countries should be 
protected against any type of restriction that may appear as a result of the application of thin 
capitalization rules, through the free movement of capital, when such rules are neither 
justified nor proportional. In this context, it is relevant to note that the application of thin 
capitalization rules that are not justified or proportional to companies of third countries may 
deter them from financing their subsidiaries situated in the EU by way of debt, even in cases 
where there is not a wholly artificial arrangement, but a transaction with real substance. 
Because of this, protection may be needed. 
The CJEU has issued some decisions with regard to national thin capitalization rules 
that have been adopted by member states. In these cases, the CJEU has examined the possible 
infringement of the fundamental freedoms envisaged in the TFEU, the presence of 
discrimination or restrictions as a consequence of the application of national thin 
capitalization rules, the existence of justifications for the use of such provisions, and the 
proportionality of the measures established by national legislation. 
The first decision of the CJEU to address the question of the compatibility of domestic 
thin capitalization rules with EU law was issued in the Lankhorst-Hohorst case and 
influenced equivalent rules in other EU Member States. 
In the Lankhorst-Hohorst judgment of 12 December 2002, the CJEU held that the 
initial German thin capitalization provisions were inconsistent with the freedom of 
establishment in accordance with article 49 of the TFEU. Especially, the CJEU found that the 
German thin capitalization rules gave rise to a different treatment between resident 
subsidiaries depending on whether their parent company had its seats in Germany or not, and 
that this represented a barrier to the freedom of establishment. The German rule provided that 
the important requirement in order to reclassify the payment of interest as a profit distribution 
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was if the shareholder who received the repayment of the loan was allowed to a corporate tax 
credit or not, and, as a rule, resident parent companies were entitled to a tax credit, while non-
resident parent companies were not.114  
In this way, the interest paid to a non-resident parent company was always taxed at a 
30% rate, while the interest paid on loans provided by a resident parent company was 
considered as an expense.115 This represented a restriction to the freedom of establishment by 
making it less appealing for companies based on other Member States to establish a 
subsidiary in Germany.116 
The CJEU rejected the argument that this different treatment was justified by the risk 
of tax evasion, given that the provision did not pursue the specific objective of avoiding 
artificial arrangements, but it was rather applicable to all cases involving parent companies 
whose residence was not in Germany. The Court added that this situation did not pose a risk 
of tax evasion since the parent company that was not domiciled in Germany would still be 
taxed in its country of residence. 117 Moreover, the ECJ rejected the above mentioned 
justification because no evasion had been proven. 
In this case, the CJEU refused the arguments used by the German government that the 
thin capitalization rules did not give rise to discrimination on the grounds of nationality, that 
they were created to deter tax evasion, and that they were legitimized by the need to guarantee 
the coherence of the tax system and the efficiency of fiscal supervision. 
On the basis of the criteria followed by the CJEU in the Lankhorst-Hohorst case, 
various groups of resident subsidiaries in the United Kingdom claimed restitution and 
compensation for the tax disadvantages that have arisen as a result of the application of the 
UK thin capitalization rules. One factor that these cases had in common was that each group 
of companies included a resident company in the UK which was at least 75% owned, directly 
or indirectly, by a non-resident parent company and had been provided a loan either by that 
parent company or by another non-resident company which was at least 75% owned, directly 
or indirectly, by the same parent company.118 
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The High Court of Justice of England and Wales questioned if national rules which 
limit the capacity of a company resident in a MS to deduct interest on loans provided by a 
direct or indirect parent company resident in another MS, in circumstances in which the 
debtor company would not be exposed to such restrictions if the parent company was resident 
in that same state, constituted an infringement to the  freedom of establishment, the free 
movement of services and/or the free movement of capital. 
In the Thin Cap Group Litigation judgement of 2007, the CJEU held that the freedom 
that was mainly affected was the right of establishment as all the cases were linked to 
companies in which at least 75% of the shares were held by a non-resident parent company119 
and, as such, the creditor exerted decisive control over the debtor. The Court added that any 
limitation to the free movement of services and capital was an inevitable result of the 
restriction on the freedom of establishment, which did not justify a separate analysis of these 
freedoms.120 
The CJEU in this case also found that the difference in treatment between resident 
subsidiaries according to the place where their parent company had its headquarters 
represented a restriction to the freedom of establishment, as it made it less appealing for 
companies based on other MS to exercise their freedom of establishment.121 
In this judgment, the CJEU accepted for the first time the justification for thin 
capitalization rules to prevent and fight tax avoidance, considering the arm’s length principle 
as a proper and equitable test of artifice.  
The CJEU also considered the proportionality of the provisions relating to thin 
capitalization, that is, if they do not go further than what is needed to prevent abuse, 
suggesting that they are regarded as such when they allow taxpayers to demonstrate the 
economic substance of the operations, and when the only amount that is recharacterized as 
dividends is the one that does not correspond to the interest that would have been paid under 
the arm’s length principle.122 
In the Lasertec judgement, the German company challenged the assessment of the tax 
authorities and, as a result, the competent Finance Court asked for a preliminary ruling from 
the CJEU, questioning if the reclassification as profit distribution of interest paid by a resident 
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corporation to a lender and substantial shareholder that is resident in a non-EU country 
comprised a restriction or discrimination to the free movement of capital between a EU 
member state and the third country. 
In this case, the CJEU adopted the criteria established in previous judgments and held 
that national rules relating to shareholders who exert decisive influence over the company's 
decisions fall under the scope of the freedom of the establishment.123 Since in this case the 
Swiss shareholder held 75% of the capital of Lasertec, the case fell solely under the freedom 
of establishment. 124 The CJEU indicated that that the freedom of establishment only involves 
an internal dimension and, as a result, it does not apply to third countries and, therefore, it 
does not apply to cases like the one in question.125 
In the NV Lammers & Van Cleef case, the CJEU stated that the Belgian legislation 
provided a different tax treatment to the interest paid by a resident company according to 
whether or not its director is a resident in Belgium. The Belgian legislation allowed the 
reclassification of interest as a profit distribution and taxed it as such only in cases where the 
director is a non-resident company and the interest is deemed excessive under the limits 
provided for in the Tax Code. Conversely, when the director is a resident company, the 
interest is not reclassified as a distribution of profits, even if it is regarded as excessive. In this 
way, non-resident companies that are directors of a Belgian company face a less favourable 
tax treatment.126 
In this case, the CJEU concluded that the difference in treatment between resident and 
non-resident directors of a Belgian corporation constituted a restriction to the freedom of 
establishment and held that such limitation went beyond what was required to meet the goal 
of preventing abusive practices, given that it could impact operations which cannot be 
regarded as artificial. 
In the Itelcar case, the CJEU considered the Portuguese thin capitalization rules 
applied between resident companies and companies from third (non-EU) countries, which are 
regarded as related parties, as contrary to the free movement of capital.127 The CJEU ruled 
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that the Portuguese provisions intended to prevent a resident company from obtaining credit 
in a way deemed excessive from a company resident in a third country. The CJEU accepted 
the argument of the Portuguese Government on the need of the rule to deter tax avoidance and 
evasion, however, the Court indicated that the rule went beyond what is necessary to achieve 
this goal and for that reason considered it inconsistent with EU law.128 
Some countries like Denmark, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United 
Kingdom have adapted their thin capitalization rules in order to be in line with the decisions 
issued by CJEU.129  A member state which has not yet adjusted its thin capitalization rules to 
be in accordance with the CJEU's criteria should do it in order to avoid any consequences, 
such as the filing of complaints against the MS and the resulting obligation to refund the taxes 
paid as a result of the application of thin capitalization provisions that are incompatible with 
the fundamental freedoms of the EU. 
Following the CJEU decision in the Lankhorst-Hohorst judgement, various Member 
States amended their provisions on thin capitalization rules. The approach followed by the 
member states in order to conform to EU legislation was essentially to broaden the scope of 
thin capitalization rules so as to include the loans that were signed between resident 
corporations- Denmark and the Netherlands opted for this approach; or to exclude intra-EU 
loans from the scope of thin capitalization provisions- Spain until 2012 and Portugal chose 
this approach. 
Within these changes, the rules introduced in Germany, Portugal and UK will deserve 
special attention. Germany adopted earnings stripping rules, under which the deductibility of 
interest expenses on loans with related and unrelated parties is limited to up 30% before 
EBITDA and applies to both resident and non-resident creditors.130Any interest expenses 
which exceed this limit are not deductible, however they can be carried forward and deducted 
in subsequent years, when they will again be subject to interest barrier rules. 
So far, there is no certainty as to whether this new rule is in line with EU law. In fact, 
the new rule does not confer a different treatment to resident and non-resident parent 
companies, however, there are still some provisions in the German legislation that may result 
in hidden discrimination. 
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In particular, thin capitalization rules do not apply in cases where companies 
constitute an integrated fiscal unit, which is considered as a single "business" for German tax 
purposes under section 4h of the GITA (German Investment Tax Act). The question is that, 
under section 14 (1) of the GCITA (German Corporate Income Tax Act), only resident 
companies can qualify as an integrated fiscal unit and the provision does not include a cross-
border dimension. Thus, a German fiscal unit with a non-resident parent company or a 
German parent company with non-resident subsidiaries is unable to take advantage of the 
opportunity to avoid triggering interest limitation rules, which may infringe the freedom of 
establishment. 131 
Currently, Portuguese thin capitalization rules are very similar to the ones adopted in 
Germany. Before the 2013 reform, the Portuguese Corporate Income Tax Code (CIRC- 
Código do Imposto sobre o Rendimento das Pessoas Colectivas) adopted a fixed ratio rule, 
according to which excessive debt was considered to occur when the value of debt in relation 
to each of the entities was more than twice the value of the corresponding shareholding in the 
taxpayer’s equity (2:1 debt-to-equity ratio). In this way, when the amount of debt of a 
Portuguese taxpayer in relation to a non-resident entity in Portugal or in an EU country with 
whom special relations existed was deemed excessive, the interest paid in relation to the part 
of the debt considered excessive would not be deductible for the purposes of assessing taxable 
income.  
After the 2013 reform, Portuguese thin capitalitalization rules were tightened. 
Particularly, under article 67º of the Portuguese Corporate Income Tax Code the deductibility 
of net financial expenses is limited to the higher of the following: EUR 1 million; or 30% of 
EBITDA, and it applies to both resident and non-resident creditors. The arm’s length 
principle is included in article 63º of the Portuguese Corporate Income Tax Code with respect 
to transfer pricing. Accordingly, any commercial transactions, including transactions or a 
series of transactions related to goods, rights, services or financial arrangements between a 
taxpayer and another entity with which it has special relations must be conducted as if they 
were independent entities carrying out comparable transactions. Hence, Portuguese thin 
capitalization rules appear to combine features of an earnings stripping rule and an arm’s 
length approach. 
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The UK, following an entirely different approach, chose to revoke its thin 
capitalization rules and alternatively applied, to transactions that fell within their scope, 
transfer pricing rules, with the result that taxpayers are no longer required to have their debt-
to-equity in a ratio established by a national thin capitalization rule, but rather to carry out all 
their operations at arm's length considering that only the amount of interest that is not in 
accordance with this principle is treated as not deductible.132 
This system is applicable to transactions which relate to both resident and non-resident 
creditors and seems to comply with EU law and the CJEU decisions, as was stated by 
Advocate General Geelhoed in the Thin Cap Group Litigation judgment.133 
Despite the fact that member states follow different thin capitalization approaches, one 
thing that they have in common is that their legislation has to be in conformity with EU law. 
However, the fact that thin capitalization rules considerably differ among member states may 
entail undesirable effects (like uncoordinated tax effects) and that’s why some authors have 
drawn attention to the need to harmonize thin capitalization rules within the EU. 
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 Thin Capitalization Rules: need of harmonization? 5.
The Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) proposal covers one single 
set of rules for the corporate tax base which aims to eliminate some of the main tax barriers 
and market distortions that hinder the effective functioning of the single market. In particular, 
in order to calculate its taxable income, a company or group of companies would have to 
follow just one EU system instead of applying different rules in each Member State that it 
operates. Furthermore, according to the CCCTB and under a "one-stop-shop" approach, 
companies which operate in more than one EU member state would only have to file a 
singular tax return for the overall of their activity within the EU.134 
The CCCTB include multiple objectives: it is designed to considerably decrease the 
administrative burden, compliance costs and legal ambiguity in the EU caused by the 
concurrence of 28 different corporate tax systems; to enable enterprises to treat the Union as a 
single market for corporate tax purposes; to give the possibility of offsetting losses of one 
entity against profits in another jurisdiction permitting the consolidation of profits and losses 
at EU level; and to turn the EU into a more competitive and attractive place for international 
investments.135 
Assuming that debt and equity will continue to be subject to different tax treatments, 
some authors have suggested the introduction of a common thin capitalization rule within the 
context of the CCCTB.136 As mentioned before in this research, national thin capitalization 
rules considerably differ between member states. Some countries do not apply thin 
capitalization rules and between those that apply, there are evident differences in their specific 
design, especially as regards their scope and effect. 
In terms of the CCCTB, the introduction of thin capitalization rules has beneficial 
results due to their capacity to mitigate this type of international tax planning. This 
assumption is based on two central aspects: first, the introduction of these rules will protect 
the tax base and, therefore, revenue, which would otherwise be exposed to erosion; and 
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second, the non-inclusion of those rules could, in itself, lead to more serious economic 
distortions. 
Not including a common thin capitalization rule in the context of the CCCTB could 
mean that Member States continue to apply their individual provisions and the resultant 
application of different national rules is considered to facilitate tax planning. 
The difference in treatment that is given by Member States to thin capitalization 
provisions may also cause some difficulties as regards double taxation and high 
administrative costs. Thus, some commentators have suggested the harmonization of the 
provisions relating to thin capitalization as an adequate solution.137 
The CCCTB proposal, under its article 81, entails a limitation to the deduction of 
interest when specific conditions are met but the Commission did not provide either an 
EBITDA test or a fixed debt-to-equity ratio in the proposal. It presented the general interest 
limitation rules as applicable to non-cooperative countries and third countries with low 
corporate income tax rates.138 
In this way, article 81 will only apply when three cumulative requirements are 
satisfied: interest is paid to an associated party, the associated company is resident in a third 
country in which the applicable corporate tax rate is low, and there is no exchange of 
information on request up to the standard of the Mutual Assistance Directive.139 
There are some practical concerns regarding the application of the CCCTB since it 
implies a high level of cooperation and coordination between countries. According to the 
CCCTB, after the company’s tax base is computed it will be apportioned to all Member States 
in which the company is active on the basis of a fixed apportionment formula which should 
be based on economic factors such as labour, capital and sales and which will determine the 
tax base of each individual taxpayer.140 Naturally, each country would try to have the most 
advantageous weighting in the formula which might lead to some difficulties. 
The application of the formula apportionment presupposes the integration of an 
economic area and a strong cooperation between States and it is questionable whether the 
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European Union has already accomplished the level of integration needed. It seems to me that 
it is unlikely that all member states will join the CCCTB and also that the CCCTB will be 
adopted via the normal EU procedure, that is, unanimous voting in the Council.141 
Besides the CCCTB proposal, the European Comission, at the beginning of 2016, 
published a proposal for a directive (the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive) which is intended to 
deal with tax avoidance and to harmonize measures that can affect the adequate function of 
the internal market. 
 Anti-BEPS Directive 6.
The European Commission, on 28 January 2016, published its proposal for a Council 
directive to deal with tax avoidance in the EU - the so-called Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive 
(ATA)142. The proposal is a product of the influences of the (so far) failed 2011 CCCTB 
proposal and the BEPS project of the OECD. 
The aim of the Directive is to improve the resilience of the single market as a whole 
against cross-border tax avoidance. For this purpose, the directive intends to reach cases 
where taxpayers act against the real purpose of the law, exploiting the differences between 
national systems to decrease their tax burden. 
The Commission resorts to article 115 of the TFEU which comprises the general rule 
for harmonization measures that affects the proper functioning of the single market. The 
reason for this is that if each member state adopts unilateral and uncoordinated measures to 
tackle tax avoidance, specifically by following divergent approaches to the implementation of 
the BEPS recommendations, the single market would face more fragmentation and barriers as 
regards cross-border activity. 
The ATA directive in its article 4 includes an interest limitation rule. According to the 
plain wording of article 4(2): “exceeding borrowing costs shall be deductible in the tax year 
in which they are incurred only up to 30 percent of the taxpayer's earnings before interest, 
tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) or up to an amount of EUR 1 000 000, 
whichever is higher. The EBITDA shall be calculated by adding back to taxable income the 
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tax-adjusted amounts for net interest expenses and other costs equivalent to interest as well 
as the tax-adjusted amounts for depreciation and amortisation”. Article 4(3) adds that the 
taxpayer may have the opportunity to deduct excessive interest in full if the taxpayer is able to 
show that the ratio of its equity over its total assets is equal to or more than the equivalent 
ratio of the group. 
By reading article 4 of the ATA directive it is possible to conclude that this interest 
limitation rule closely resembles the German and Portuguese interest barrier rules, which also 
limit the deduction of interest expense up to 30% of the EBITDA. 
In this context, it is worth noting that just two weeks after the release of the ATA 
directive proposal, on 10 February 2016, the German Federal Tax Court (Bundesfinanzhof, 
BFH) made a decision regarding the German interest limitation rule (Zinsschranke). Given 
that both rules are very similar, one may question if the findings of the BFH may be, to some 
extent, also valid for the interest barrier rule suggested in the ATA-Directive proposal. 
In this case, the taxpayer, a German company claimed that, at least in a purely national 
situation, the German earnings stripping rule infringes the principle of equal treatment, as 
provided for in Article 3 of the German Constitution. The BFH supported the view of the 
taxpayer and referred the matter to the German Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG) to obtain a judgment about the compatibility of this rule 
with Article 3 of the German Constitution.143 
Considering the BVerfG previous case law, the court has interpreted the equal 
treatment as a principle which includes the ability to pay doctrine. In other words, taxpayers 
should be taxed equally but taking into consideration their financial capacity to pay taxes. As 
regards corporate taxpayers, the BVerfG has established the objective net principle, meaning 
that companies should be taxed based on their net profits and including the fact that business 
costs, as a rule, must be deductible from the taxable base.144 
In accordance with the BFH, the German interest barrier provision has infringed the 
objective net principle since it limits the deduction of interest, which is to be qualified as 
business costs. The possibility of reporting the interest for future years does not change that, 
because in an annual periodic tax system, the costs should be deductible in the year they are 
incurred. Moreover, the deduction of interest which is carried forward in subsequent years is 
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also subject to 30% -EBITDA-rule, which makes the use of the interest carry-forward 
practically impossible for companies that face a period of stagnation.145 
Furthermore, according to the BFH, the infringement of the objective net principle 
cannot be justified by the premise that the interest carry-forward possibly allows for a full 
deduction of interest considering the entire period of existence of a company. The justification 
is that the German legislation decided to apply an annual periodical tax system. A multi-tax-
period approach is accepted in relation to losses, but not with regard to business expenses that 
can be reported to a particular fiscal year. Hence, the BFH considers that the cases of loss 
carry-forward and interest carry-forward are not analogous nor worthy of comparison.146 
Due to the similarities of the German earnings stripping rule with the interest barrier 
rule proposed by the ATA directive, particularly their application to both domestic and cross-
border situations, the very high threshold to limit its scope to only a small group of taxpayers, 
and the violation of the objective net principle, it is possible that the BFH may consider the 
interest barrier rule proposed in the ATA directive contrary to the principle of equality 
provided for in the German constitution. 
It is interesting to see a national provision which strongly resembles the one 
established in the directive proposal being challenged internally.   
 Interim conclusions 7.
This chapter was devoted to addressing how states are responding to this debt bias 
issue and has also analysed the effort made by the OECD and the EU in combating base 
erosion and profit shifting through the use of inflated interest deduction. We saw that the most 
common response has been the adoption of thin capitalization and earnings stripping rules. 
They have seemed to be effective in curtailing this kind of aggressive tax planning. However, 
as we are going to see in the following chapter, their application may also entail some adverse 
effects. For this reason, some authors have been suggesting that the real solution to prevent 
the erosion of the tax base is to eliminate the different treatment applied to debt and equity 
and that the application of a neutral tax treatment to debt and equity financing would alleviate 
the need to create tax schemes to obtain tax advantages from the use of debt financing. 
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Part III - Towards more neutrality between debt and equity 
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1. Potencial negative impact of thin capitalization rules on levels of investment 
In terms of their effectiveness, thin capitalization rules, in fact, appear to have 
decreased debt ratios.147 However, there are some economic surveys which establish that the 
imposition of constraints on particular forms of international tax planning may result in 
unfavourable consequences with respect to investment made by international groups in 
countries which apply high tax rates.148 
In this context, it is pertinent to consider the cases of foreign subsidiaries that finance 
their operations with internal debt usually granted by low-tax related parties and, as a result, 
enjoy a comparatively low tax burden. When a thin capitalization rule is introduced, 
companies that strongly rely on debt finance will face a situation of excessive debt, that is, 
debt that exceeds the threshold determined by the debt/equity ratio. Consequently, a part of 
the interest deduction will be disallowed, and there will be an increase in the tax burden as a 
result. This may have the effect of decelerating foreign direct investment.149  Also, even if 
companies opted to reduce their internal debt finance levels, the tax burden would also 
increase, given that companies would be applying less tax-efficient financing. 
In the presence of a thin capitalization provision, when there is an increase in the tax 
rate, the tax shield from internal debt financing is less efficient for companies with limited 
deductibility of interest. As a result, there will be an increase in the tax burden and the tax 
sensitivity of foreign direct investment may increase when a thin-capitalization rule is 
introduced. Such policies are also considered to possibly enhance tax competition.150 
Companies that do not use much internal debt are usually below the debt/equity ratio 
and any deduction of interest is, in principle, not denied. In, this way, the introduction of thin-
capitalization rules would not affect those companies. However, studies seem to suggest that 
it is more likely to find companies that are subject to limitation of interest deduction in 
countries that apply higher tax rates. Accordingly, some authors have considered that the 
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introduction of thin capitalization rules may have negative effects on foreign direct 
investment, especially in countries that apply high statutory tax rates.151 
Despite the fact that some preoccupation has arisen over the impact of thin 
capitalization rules on levels of investment, recent studies have not succeeded in establishing, 
in pragmatic terms, a direct correlation between thin capitalization rules and investment 
levels.152 However, some concerns remain over an eventual decrease of tax sensitivity 
resulting from the introduction of thin capitalization rules. There has been a tendency among 
OECD countries to reduce their corporate tax rates while introducing anti profit-shifting rules. 
Assuming that thin capitalization rules, in fact, reduce tax sensitivity, the economic impact of 
potential corporate tax reductions would be limited. As a result, the ability of governments to 
stimulate foreign investment through the introduction of those reductions would also be 
limited. In this way, the decrease of tax sensitivity should be taken into consideration when 
introducing thin capitalization rules. 
2. Possible solutions to achieve more neutrality  
The fact that many member states confer a different tax treatment to interest and 
dividends constitutes the main reason why some multinational groups opt to finance their 
affiliates by means of debt rather than equity capital. This led to the need to create thin 
capitalization rules. Against this background, some authors have argued that the best solution 
to prevent the erosion of the MS’s tax base is to give a neutral treatment to both debt and 
equity financing, meaning that the need to adopt tax schemes in order to obtain tax advantages 
will no longer exist and, consequently, it will not be necessary to design anti aggressive tax 
planning rules to address this matter. This would also mean that concerns regarding the 
compatibility of such rules with EU law would cease.153 
Two alternatives are suggested regarding the design of corporate tax systems in order 
to remove the distortion caused by the different treatment that is given to debt and equity 
financing by dealing with both sources of funding in the same manner- an Allowance for 
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Corporate Equity (ACE) or a comprehensive business income tax (CBIT). The ACE would 
allow for a deduction for return on equity (as in the case of interest payments) and would 
consequently mitigate or eliminate the tax benefits of debt finance. The CBIT system, in turn, 
would deny the deduction of interest for corporate income tax purposes. The common factor 
in these systems is that they are both intended to counteract the distortionary impact of 
corporate taxes on the financial structure of companies. 
Recently, the CBIT and the ACE have raised interest in the EU policy debates as a 
possible path to readjust corporate tax systems.154 Some countries have experienced or 
implemented changes in their tax laws with characteristics similar to the ACE system. The 
majority of countries have established limits on the deduction of interest which further 
resembles the CBIT.155  
2.1 CBIT 
The CBIT aims to remove the advantageous tax treatment that is given to investment 
that is financed with debt, by proposing the disallowance of the deduction of interest 
payments. In 1992, the US Treasury suggested the CBIT and its proposal comprised an 
important distinction between CBIT entities and non-CBIT entities.156 
In principle, most companies will classify as CBIT entities (only small companies will 
not) which are not allowed to interest deductions. This would also be applicable to financial 
firms, including banks. In order to prevent double taxation of interest, it should be given a tax 
exemption or credit to interest received by companies or banks from other CBIT entities. 
However, if the interest payment comes from a non-CBIT entity, it will be exposed to tax. 
Interest that is received from abroad, in principle, will be subject to tax, however, if the 
interest received comes from a CBIT entity it should be tax exempted or credited.157 
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The CBIT has the effect of increasing the cost of capital for a debt financed 
investment because the interest paid is no longer deductible when calculating the tax 
base.158Despite the fact that this reform leads to an increase in the capital cost, it might be 
recommended for a country to apply it if, at the same time, the country adopts a lower 
corporate tax rate since the tax base is now broader. 
Therefore, the CBIT deals with debt as present CIT systems deal with equity 
financing. It is compatible with a wide, source-based tax on investment income which is 
retained at the enterprise level. As all capital income is taxed at the company level, the CBIT 
may be combined with the elimination of personal income tax on interest, dividends and 
capital gains.159 
The CBIT removes distortions in the financial structure of companies, but increases 
the cost of capital when investments are financed by debt. The latter may have the result of 
reducing investment but, at the same time, since the CIT base will be broader, it will allow a 
reduction in the CIT rate as part of a revenue-neutral reform. Hence, the tax burden on 
profitable equity financing will be reduced. Additionally, a decrease in the corporate income 
tax rate will also make a country more appealing for foreign direct investment. 
In 2007, Sorensen found that, in general, the effect of the CBIT is unclear: on one 
hand, the cost of capital for low-income debt financed investments is likely to rise, which may 
represent a decrease in investments; on the other, highly profitable equity financed 
investments will be less taxed so these investments will probably expand.160 Following Bond 
(2000), the advantages arising from lower tax rates under CBIT will presumably compensate 
for the costs incurred due to a higher cost of capital.161 
Until now, there are no practical examples of the CBIT system and according to 
Mooij, its implementation can possibly result in transitional problems and practical 
adversities, as for example, difficulties in treating pre-existing debt.162 In this way, the 
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implementation of such a system should be gradual and take place over a long period of time. 
The CBIT system, in a short-term, may also pose some risks with respect to financial distress. 
A partial application of the CBIT to intra-group debt financing may be effective in 
reducing the levels of debt shifting by multinational companies, although it implies 
coordination between countries. Hence, states would consider all intra-group financial flows 
as equity and tax their returns accordingly. Therefore, international groups would no longer 
be able to shift their profits through debt across jurisdictions. 
Nevertheless, if the CBIT system is unilaterally applied, this could aggravate 
international debt shifting as companies would stop financing their investments with debt in 
countries that apply this system (since the deductibility of interest is not allowed) and would 
rather finance their investments in the countries that do not apply the CBIT with debt which 
derived from countries that apply the system (given that interest payments are usually not 
taxed.)163 In addition to this, it may give rise to double taxation in cases where countries do 
not allow foreign tax credits or exemptions for interest payments arising from CBIT 
countries. 
2.2 ACE 
The ACE system was initially suggested by the Capital Taxes Committee of the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies in 1991. The system rests on an earlier idea developed by 
Boadway and Bruce in 1984, who proposed an allowance for corporate capital (ACC).164 The 
authors’ suggestion was to eliminate the deduction of actual interest payments and to 
substitute it with an allowance of the normal return, applied to the book value of all the 
company’s capital according to the tax accounts.  
The ACE lightly differs from the ACC as it continues to allow the deduction of 
interest payments. In addition to the deduction of interest, a notional return on equity would 
also be deductible against companies’ profits. (Bond and Devereux, 1995). 
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The ACE is perceived to have some appealing characteristics. One important feature is 
that it achieves neutrality between debt and equity financing. Therefore, the ACE renders thin 
capitalization rules inessential.165 
Another feature of this system is its neutrality on the subject of marginal investment 
decisions. Since the ACE allows a deduction for both interest and the normal rate of return on 
equity, it is not intended to tax capital income. In this sense, the system is intended to only tax 
economic rents and no tax would be levied on investments whose return corresponds to the 
cost of capital.166 
Despite the fact that the ACE is more neutral than present corporate tax regimes with 
respect to investment and its financial structure, it also includes some disadvantages. In 
particular, the ACE has the effect of narrowing the tax base (since deduction on equity is now 
allowed) which would imply a decrease in corporate tax revenue collected by states.167 As a 
result, states would probably apply higher taxes elsewhere in order to compensate this 
revenue loss and to balance the government budget. One possible option would be to increase 
the corporate tax rate. 
In this context, the ACE would transfer the tax burden from marginal return to capital 
to economic rents. If one considers a closed economy, which is characterized by a perfect 
capital market, the tax system would not be distortionary. However, inasmuch as the 
economies are open, rents can be mobile. For example, specific rents of companies related to 
brands or patents may be shifted across countries. Hence, the move from capital to rents 
would influence the production location.168  
The ACE system also seems to impact investment decisions when companies 
encounter credit constraints. In particular, these restrictions are applicable to new and 
innovative companies which still do not have a reputation. Assuming that these companies 
cannot get credit from banks or investors, they will depend on retained earnings as a way to 
finance their new projects. Hence, an increase in the corporate tax rate would not benefit such 
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companies since it will decrease cash flow and liquidity of companies.169 This allows them to 
finance more investment from retained earnings. A lower corporate tax rate allows companies 
to finance more projects with retained earnings. 
The ACE might be considered undesirable with respect to international profit shifting. 
There are several options which are made available for multinational groups to shift profits 
across jurisdictions. The fact that countries apply different statutory tax rates is the main 
reason why international profit shifting techniques are exploited by states. Since an ACE is 
only advantageous for states’ revenue when accompanied by an increase in statutory tax rates, 
the government is likely to lose revenue through the application profit shifting strategies 
towards other countries.170 
It is important to note that the ACE system does not necessarily imply an increase in 
the corporate tax rate. An increase in the tax on consumption, for instance, may be another 
candidate to make up for the revenue costs of the ACE. In this way, the economic 
consequences of an ACE system may be different if this alternative way to balance the 
government budget is applied. 
International tax planning by means of intra-group loans might also change given that 
debt and equity would receive a more neutral treatment according to the ACE system. In this 
way, if all countries adopted this system, multinational companies would no longer feel 
motivated to adapt their intra-group debt-to-equity ratios. Conversely, if the ACE system is 
adopted by only one country, international groups may have an incentive to locate their equity 
in that country since equity returns would not be fully taxed.171 If the distribution of dividends 
is exempted in the country of the parent company, it makes it appealing for multinationals to 
channel equity to the ACE country and decrease their overall tax burden. 
Various countries have experienced some variants of the ACE system. Croatia, 
Austria and Italy implemented variants of the ACE but they were subsequently brought to an 
end. However, according to Keen and King (2002), this was not due to administrative or 
technical difficulties.172 The abolition of the ACE was rather part of a reform directed at 
decreasing the corporate income tax rates. Klemm (2007) indicates that these ACE reforms 
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have been linked to a reduction in debt/equity ratios.173 At present, Brazil, Latvia and 
Belgium apply some variations of the ACE. 
Brazil has introduced the concept of “interest on net equity” (“INE”) into its corporate 
income tax system. Shareholders may be remunerated either through the payment of 
dividends, which are not deductible for corporate income tax purposes, or through the INE. 
INE paid to shareholders is deductible for purposes of corporate income tax, subject to the 
following limits: “(a) the official long-term interest rate times accounting net equity, and (b) 
50 per cent of taxable income, before the deduction of INE.174 
In 2006, Belgium adopted the notional interest deduction (NID), which establishes an 
interest deduction with respect to equity financing, regardless of whether dividends are paid. 
The deduction corresponds to the interest rate on 10-year Belgian state bonds multiplied by 
the amount of the company’s net assets. Although the goal of the NID is to narrow the 
different treatment of debt and equity financing, such differences persist due to differences in 
the treatment of interest and dividends received by investors.175 
The economic implications of ACE reforms remain slightly unclear. Not only is there 
insufficient information provided but it is also difficult to assess the ACE individually since 
in most cases it was part of a multiple reform.176 
2.3 ACE and CBIT combinations 
In theory, there can be a combination of the ACE and CBIT systems. For example, 
Italy and Austria in their experiments did not exempt normal economic profits from taxation, 
but rather applied a lower tax rate on such profits than on economic rents.177 Hence, these 
systems can be typified as partial ACE systems. In the same way, reforms which establish 
restrictions on the deduction of interest, such as thin capitalization rules or earnings stripping 
rules, can be seen as partial CBIT reforms. 
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The discrimination between debt and equity can be reduced by a combined reform of a 
partial ACE and a partial CBIT.178Simultaneously, the implications for corporate tax revenue 
should be counterbalanced. Consequently, the optimal combination would include a reform 
package of a partial ACE and partial CBIT which is revenue neutral for the states and even 
more neutral in relation to the companies’ financial structures. 
It is rather difficult to determine an ideal combination of ACE and CBIT. In order to 
achieve optimality, not only financial distortions would have to be reduced, but also 
distortions of the corporate income tax, including location distortions, investment distortions, 
and aggressive tax planning via profit shifting.179 Different countries have different levels of 
distortions. Therefore, optimality rules will differ accordingly. 
Furthermore, these distortions depend on how countries draft their systems. They 
could do so unilaterally or multilaterally. An economic perspective regarding optimality 
conditions may indicate that some countries will consider that it is optimal to shift the tax 
burden to other tax bases. For example, an ACE can be financed by a raise in labour or 
consumption taxes. Countries may rather reduce their corporate tax rates and cut back 
transfers, achieving effectiveness in this way. 
It is, however, not only a question of effectiveness. Equity issues have to be taken into 
account when questioning if such policies are socially advantageous or even alluring. To 
reach optimality, it is necessary to get a full assessment of key trade-offs between equity, 
efficiency, and administrative feasibility. 
In my opinion, a reform in the tax system with the objective of eliminating the existing 
discrimination between the two financing forms appears to be an attractive and reasonable 
idea. Nonetheless, I believe that a more thorough analysis remains to be made on this subject 
in order to more clearly assess the implications arising from a reform which combines a 
partial ACE and a partial CBIT. 
Even if countries choose to make reforms towards more neutrality, I think that it will 
always be effective for them to have rules in their tax systems which limit the deductibility of 
interest so that governments may have the necessary tools to prevent the erosion of the tax 
base.  
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I consider that the amount of equity return that corresponds to the cost of capital may 
also be regarded as the cost of doing business and, as such, like interest, it should also be 
deductible up to a pre-determined threshold. Moreover, although the approximation between 
the treatment of debt and equity is likely to lead to a decrease in the adoption of tax schemes 
aimed at gaining tax advantages, this does not make interest limitation rules unnecessary.  
A reform which allows the deductibility of equity returns that correspond to the cost of 
capital is likely to result in a decrease in the states’ tax bases since new deductions are now 
allowed. In this way, it is important to counterbalance the effects of such a reform, that is, if 
in an overall framework this reform is desirable to the economic and social sustainability of 
the welfare state. If so, deducting equity returns levelling the cost of financing appear an 
interesting idea. At the same time, interest would still be deductible but with limits. 
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3. Conclusions 
The different tax treatment between equity and debt finance gives multinational 
companies opportunities for tax arbitrage on an international level. Tax arbitrage is essentially 
the process of taking advantage of the differences in the tax rates applied by countries and is 
only achieved because the country of the lender applies a more advantageous tax rate than the 
country of the borrower. If this is the case, international groups naturally opt for debt-
financing rather than equity financing so as to decrease the group’s general tax burden by 
shifting income from high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax ones via debt-financing. 
This has the result of eroding the corporate tax base of the borrower’s country and, 
because of this, thin capitalization rules and earnings stripping rules are generally considered 
to be effective measures to combat financial structures which are excessively leveraged. In 
order to counter the debt bias problem, the most popular reaction has been the adoption of 
thin capitalization rules not only within the EU, but also among OECD countries. The OECD 
has done extensive work on the matter of international tax avoidance especially through the 
BEPS project whose Action 4 recommendations assumed particular importance for this 
research. 
In the EU context, some of the thin capitalization rules adopted by MS were 
considered to be incompatible with the EU fundamental freedoms and, as a result, a number 
of member states have adapted their thin capitalization rules in order to be in conformity with 
the EU law.  
The fact that thin capitalization rules considerably differ among member states may 
lead to uncoordinated tax effects deriving from their application, mainly in relation to third 
countries. An appropriate solution would be to create common thin capitalization rules in the 
EU context. This could be done in the context of the secondary law that has already been 
created and adopted by MS in relation to dividends or interest, or in the context of the 
CCCTB or ATA Directives. Assuming that debt and equity will remain subject to different 
tax treatments, it seems reasonable to introduce a common thin capitalization rule among 
member states.  
Although some studies suggest that the adoption of thin capitalization rules may have 
a potential negative impact on investment in high-tax jurisdictions, introducing these rules has 
positive effects in curtailing international tax planning through debt financing. Their 
implementation will protect the tax base, and consequently the revenue. Also, not to include 
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rules that put a limitation on the interest deduction could give rise to many more economic 
distortions. 
However, what some authors have been suggesting is that the real solution to prevent 
the erosion of the tax base is to eliminate the different treatment applied to interest and 
dividends. The application of a neutral tax treatment to debt and equity financing would 
alleviate the need to create tax schemes to obtain tax advantages from the use of debt 
financing. 
With the aim of neutralizing the divergent treatment that is given to debt and equity, 
two more radical solutions were suggested- the ACE and the CBIT systems The ACE would 
allow for a deduction for return on equity (as in the case of interest payments) and would, 
consequently, mitigate or eliminate the tax benefits of debt finance. The CBIT system, in turn, 
would deny the deduction of interest for corporate income tax purposes. 
These systems appear to have some appealing features but there are also some 
drawbacks associated with them. These should be counterbalanced to assess the effectiveness 
of the systems. A possible combination between a partial ACE system and a partial CBIT 
system appears to be an attractive idea, but there is still research that remains to be done on 
this subject. 
A reform in the tax systems aimed at ending with the discrimination between the two 
sources of financing seems an interesting and feasible idea but more direct evidence on its 
plausibility should be provided since some implications are liable to derive from this reform. 
Given the present context and the universal effort made in the direction of thin capitalization 
rules, their adoption seems to be the most pragmatic solution in the short run. Furthermore, it 
seems to me that they are, in fact, effective in reducing debt-to-equity ratios and tax 
avoidance and that their life expectancy is still long. Despite the fact that countries may 
undertake reforms towards more neutrality, I believe that it will always be convenient for 
them to have rules that limit the deduction of interest, that is, rules that help governments to 
prevent the erosion of the tax base.  
In the same way that interest is the cost of doing business, so is the injection of capital 
in a company until the moment that the capital cost is recovered. In my view, the amount of 
equity return that corresponds to the cost of capital or cost of financing should also be 
considered as the cost of doing business and, as such, this amount (like interest) could be 
deductible up to a pre-established threshold.  
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The question remains whether this discrimination between the two forms of financing 
is justified and why an investment financed via debt should receive a more favourable tax 
treatment than one that has been financed with equity capital. 
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